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2 The Cresset 
Making Your Mark 
One of the more dreary tasks of college teachers 
today, and a task which takes more of their time away 
from humane teaching, is aiding and abetting students 
to become as abstract as possible. By that I mean 
helping students to "test well" so that they can show 
up as a favorable set of statistical marks on a variety of 
standardized tests channeling them into the credentialed 
society. If the trend continues, the senior thesis may 
become the resume, and all bachelor's degrees will be 
awarded in absentia to pleated folds of computer 
pr£nt-outs. 
Leading us into a discussion of the standardized 
tests now shuffl£ng college graduates into their slots 
in the technolog£cal society are two recent alumni of 
the University, Dan P. McAdams and Rebecca R. Pall-
meyer. Each has kindly written a non-statistical and 
unranked introduction of the other. 
By Rebecca R. Pallmeyer "Dan McAdams grew 
up in Gary, Indiana. He was graduated from the Uni-
versity in 1976, with majors in psychology and the 
humanities, and did graduate work at Harvard Uni-
versity where he enr£ched the scientific community 
with data on his Lambda Chi Alpha fraternity brothers 
at Valparaiso. After earning his Ph.D. in personality 
and developmental psychology in 1979, Dr. McAdams 
spent a year in post-doctoral research at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota and as an instructor at St. Olaf Col-
lege in Northfield. He now teaches in the clinical 
division of the psychology department at Loyola 
University of Chicago. He is actively pursuing re-
search in human motivation and life-span develop-
mental psychology. Away from the think-tank, he 
competes in intramural basketball, plays a tenor re-
corder, and a_gonizes with every Cubs defeat. " 
By Dan P. McAdams "Born in Tokyo, Rebecca 
Pallmeyer spent most of her childhood in St. Louis, 
Missoun·. She attended Valparaiso University (as did 
four of her five siblings) and was graduated in 1976 
with majors in history and the humanities. After taking 
her J D. from the University of Chicago in 1979, she 
served a year as law clerk to Minnesota Supreme Court 
Justice R osalie E. Wahl and is presently employed in 
the trial section of the Chicago law firm of Hopkins 
and Sutter. Her particular interests in the law include 
the First Amendment, the rules of evidence, and federal 
jurisdiction. Outside the courtroom, Rebecca enjoys a 
host of extralegal pastimes· she is an alto in the church 
choir, a meticulous seamstress a gourmet cook, and an 
avid reader of Dons Lessing, W H Auden, and the 
ew York Time ." 
The Cres et welcomes alumnus McAdams and 
alumna Pallme er to In Luce ua. 
The Editor 
pn·t, 1981 
IN LUCE TUA 
College Students 
In Rank and File 
What Do Tests Test? 
1H rt , 1 II The lllO 
ht tory , \\, r · A 
Dan P. McAdams 
A of thi 
m 
All of us are motivated to construct some order in chaos and to do so with the fewest number 
of concepts that will account for the largest amount of variability we observe in the world. 
Record Examination, GRE), law schools (the Law School 
Admi ion Te t, LSAT), and medical chools (the 
Medical College Aptitude Test, MCAT). The tests are 
touted as scientifically valid predictors of success in 
colleges, graduate schools, and the like and are thus 
given substantial weight by admissions judges who are 
entrusted with the responsibility of ranking applicants 
and then drawing lines of demarcation which separate 
the admitted from the rejected. 
Although judges typically take into consideration 
a number of other criteria in making an admission de-
cision (such as letters of recommendation, previous 
school grades, extracurricular activities, life exper-
ience), evidence suggests that standardized exam scores 
are in most cases the paramount litmus test. Many 
students know this. Consequently, the experience of 
taking an SAT or GRE is frightful for many who antic-
ipate a kind of ultimate ranking. So that there is no 
ambiguity with respect to rank, the raw scores that 
arrive in the mail months later are readily converted 
into percentiles. A score at the 75th percentile indi-
cates that, in a random sample of one hundred students 
from across the country taking the examination, this 
particular person ranks above 7 4 of them and below 25. 
I am not composing a jeremiad against ranking, al-
though I do believe that our society's obsession with it 
is bizarre. Nor am I arguing that the prevailing ranking 
procedures promulgated by the ETS should be scrapped. 
Rather, I would like for a moment to examine these 
procedures-the SAT, GRE, LSAT, MCAT-in more 
detail. In particular, I would like to consider their 
worth, that is, how well these tests serve as efficient 
and veridical ranking instruments. 
The Reliabilit y and Validity of Tests 
In considering the worth of any measuring (or rank-
ing) device, one can address two distinct issues: relia-
bility and validity. Although not all theorists of meas-
urement would agree, the consensual opinion is that 
reliability is the more significant of the two and that 
if a test is not reliable it cannot be seen as valid. In es-
sence, reliability concerns consistency. Reliable instru-
ments can be counted on; they are not capricious, 
temperamental, or easily distracted. Thus, if Aspirant 
A takes the SAT after eating Raisin Bran on Friday and 
scores in the 99th percentile and then takes the same 
exam the following Friday after eating Wheaties and 
scores in the 33rd percentile, one of two conclusions 
commends itself: either (a) there is an heretofore un-
documented and mysterious link between type of cereal 
eaten ·and performance on aptitude exame or (b) the 
test is not reliable. 
Respectable reliability does not require exact cor-
respondence between scores at Time 1 and Time 2. 
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Certainly, a multitude of extraneous factors (the exam-
taker's mood, fatigue, practice effects, the weather, 
etc.) may exert some kind of influence upon test per-
formance. But more reliable tests are relatively resis-
tant to idiosyncratic contextual effects. Intelligence 
tests (measures of IQ) are exemplary in this regard. 
Although there are notable exceptions, most persons' 
IQ scores remain relatively stable from adolescence 
into middle adulthood. Since intelligence is thought 
not to flip from high to low and back to high for a given 
individual over time, it is fortunate that our measure 
of it manifest the same expected consistency. 
The reliability record for ranking procedures used 
by the ETS is satisfactory by most standards. Over short 
periods of time, most students show fairly high stabil-
ity in test scores. Of course, drastic changes in an indi-
vidual's life can significantly alter his or her test results, 
but these occurrences are rare. Thus, Aspirant B will 
probably not improve his overall ranking among his 
peers by taking the SAT a week after struggling through 
it the first time. Most evidence suggests, then, that 
the SAT and its counterparts are highly reliable. 
Validity is a trickier issue. Validity concerns how well 
a test measures what it claims to measure. It is very 
possible that a ranking device could be perfectly reli-
able but completely invalid. An absurd example: One 
might wish to rank the quality of quarterbacks in the 
National Football League by examining the number of 
chemistry courses they took in college. Thus, the quar-
terback ranked first would be I the one who took the 
most chemistry courses; the last the one( s) who took no 
chemistry; and all others ranked in between. Assuming 
that academic transcripts are available for these men, 
this arbitrary ranking device would be highly reliable: 
If the ranks were calculated this fall and again this 
spring the results should be identical. But such a meas-
uring device would (we hope) be absolutely invalid 
for the criterion (excellence in quarterbacking) at hand. 
To anthropomorphize, reliable measures are stead-
fast and faithful; valid measures are sagacious, astute, 
and in-tune. Whereas reliable measures do the same 
thing at Time 2 as at Time 1, valid measures do what 
they are supposed to do every time they try to do it. 
But how can we know whether or not a ranking device 
is doing what it is supposed to do-how can we in fact 
determine its validity? 
One test for validity is predictive power. SATs are 
moderately predictive of success (measured by grades) 
in colleges; likewi e, LSATs and GREs are fair pre-
dictors of grade-point average in law school and gradu-
ate chool (though the evidence is less compelling here 
than in the. ca e of the SAT). When the criterion i 
switched, however, from school grade to other indice 
of academic and nonacademic achievement the ranking 
device o e ential for admi sion deci ion lo e almo t 
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Rank-ordering phenomena, therefore, facilitates the coherent organization of our experience, 
parsing and punctuating what the prescientific infant must see as booming, buzzing confusion. 
all of their predictive efficacy. In an influential paper 
written in 1973, Harvard psychologist David McClel-
land reviewed all of the data available and concluded 
that "no consistent relationship exists between SAT 
scores in college students and their actual accomplish-
ments in social leadership, the arts, sciences, music, 
writing, and speech and drama.2 · When confounding 
variables such as social class (which is highly correlated 
with SAT score) and quality of graduate or preprofes-
sional school are statistically controlled, the prediction 
records for the GRE, LSAT, and MCAT are even more 
dismal. Clearly, excellence in professions that appear 
to require a high degree of scholastic aptitude depends 
upon something more than performance on scholastic 
aptitude tests. 
The Respondent and Operant Responses 
Another way to look at validity is to evaluate the 
meaning of whatever it is a measuring device pur-
ports to measure. Psychologists term this general facet 
of validity "construct . validity." At issue here is the 
meaning of the construct (concept) "scholastic aptitude." 
An aptitude refers to a potentiality for behavior. If a 
candidate ranks high<in an aptitude for, say, teaching, 
it is assumed he or she possesses the potential to be an 
excellent teacher. Such a person may or may not have 
had teaching experience, which links conceptually to 
achievement testing. Achievement tests purport to meas-
ure how much one has learned by virtue of having en-
gaged in a structured sequence of activities. In essence, 
achievement tests look backward to past experience which 
has provided a lesson. Aptitude tests look forward to 
future experiences which require a potentiality for a 
particular set of behaviors or competencies. To test 
what a student has learned from a particular math 
course, a teacher would administer an achievement 
test. To predict how well he or she might do in future 
math courses, or to predict the likelihood that he or 
she would make a significant contribution to the world 
of mathematics, the teacher would admini ter an apti-
tude test. 
If scholastic aptitude tests are suppo ed to mea ure 
a potentiality for scholarship, this potentiality hould 
not, one would think, be ub tantially influenced by a 
hort-term set of experiences (which would theoretically 
influence an achievement te t). The meaning of th 
con truct cholastic aptitude i violated, therefor 
when evidence is garnered which strongly upport th 
the is that coaching, manual , and hurry-up trainin 
cour e designed to rai e a tudent' AT cor ar 
markedly succe ful. Thi exact finding, long u p t d 
by much of the p ychological community but 
2 1c lelland. D. . Te ting for competence rath r than intelligenc • 
Amen·canPsychologzst, 1973 , 28.1-1 . 
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tently deemed implausible by the ETS, was recently 
reported by the New York Times and will soon appear 
in a scientific report prepared for the American Psy-
chological Association.3 Twenty hours of special in-
struction in taking the SAT does raise students' scores 
significantly. This well-documented finding is down-
right alarming, rendering the construct validity of the 
SAT dubious at best. 
Despite their adequate reliability, then, the validity 
of these popular ranking tool i highly suspect. Al-
though there are probably many factor underlying the 
validity issue, one po ibly critical flaw in tandardized 
tests might be their reliance upon a multipl -choice 
format which reward tudent who ar able to make 
fine-tuned di crimination among po ible an wer 
presented by the exam and puni h~ tudent le kill d 
in making such di tinction but m re ad pt at r ating 
their own respon e to que tion , or framin th ir own 
questions, thu tran ending a multipl - hoi t. 
The distinction i betwe n hoo ing a ready-mad 




re pondent , not op rant : tudent who do well on 
admi ion multiple-choice exam al o do well on this 
ame kind of exam in college course . o much for the 
ignificant relationship between SAT cores and col-
lege grades. But when an operant criterion is to be 
predicted-for instance, accomplishment in one's pro-
fe sion-respondent usually prove ineffectual. I would 
submit that much of critical inquiry, much of scholar-
hip, and much of life exists in the operant mode. If 
we are to increase the validity of extant ranking pro-
cedures employed in academia, it behooves us to develop 
techniques that enable students' generative and crea-
tive capacities to emerge and be recognized. 
Such techniques are being developed. During the 
past ten years, a group of psychologists in Boston has 
been formulating alternative assessment strategies 
which provide for systematic evaluation and ranking 
in the operant mode.s One powerful device developed 
is the Thematic Analysis Test, which presents the 
student with two sets of text and asks him · or her to 
delineate, in an operant manner, the specific content 
themes that effectively differentiate between the two. 
This kind of rudimentary literary criticism appears 
to be an especially valuable competency that escapes 
traditional respondent assessment. 
In an intriguing piece of research, the psychologists 
who have developed the thematic technique have shown 
that it is this particular competency assessed in an 
operant manner that appears to be cultivated in high-
quality liberal arts colleges which place prime empha-
sis upon reading, discussing, and interpreting the clas-
sic works of scholarship. Matched groups of students 
attending large state universities and students attend-
ing smaller liberal arts schools were administ~red 
the thematic measure as freshmen and later as semors. 
Although the two groups performed equally well at the 
outset of their college careers, after three-and-a-half 
years of higher education the students who had been 
attending the small liberal arts schools performed at _a 
much more sophisticated level on the test than their 
peers attending the state school, sugges_ting that f~c-
tors in the liberal arts educational expenence contnb-
uted to the difference. Available respondent measures 
fai led to reveal this distinction. 
Although they are not panaceas for shortcomings in 
test validity, operant measures of scholastic achieve-
ment and aptitude appear to be more sensitive to certain 
subtle but significant aspects of scholarship glossed 
over by SAT-like ranking devices. Educators may hope 
that contemporary developments in operant assessm~nt 
foreshadow more refined and more diverse rankmg 
strategies in academia and elsewhere as the glorifica-
tion of the multiple-choice mentality give way to a 
more multi-faceted view of scholarship, aptitude, and 
• •• the ranking of persons. •• 
5 Winter, D. G. , McClelland , D. C., and Stewart, Competence in 
college: Evaluating the liberal university. an Franci co : Jo e -
Bass, 1979. 
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IN LUCE TUA II 
The Bar 
Exam Blues 
What Is Wrong With 
This Initiation Rite? 
Rebecca R. Pallmeyer 
I took the Illinois bar examination last July. Having 
survived the whole miserable experience. I cannot 
resist the temptation to comment publicly upon this 
bizarre initiation rite imposed upon new lawyers by 
older ones. 1 
For me, the ordeal began shortly after the last week-
end of May, which I remember as the last time I enjoyed 
myself until August. It was at that time that I bega_n 
officially studying for the bar exam, although sporadic 
panicking had begun several months earlier. Unlike 
many bar candidates who take off from work for much 
of the summer and enroll in a local bar review course 
to "beef up" for the exam, I was, unfortunately, com-
mitted to working full time, and living in Minnesota 
while trying to prepare for the Illinois exam- two 
psychological strikes against me right from the start. 
I was lucky enough to borrow a friend's Illinois bar 
review materials from the year before (I worried, nat-
urally, that they were out of date), and I signed up for 
the Minnesota bar review course, figuring that Minne-
sota law would overlap considerably with Illinois law. 
With tearful goodbyes to my family and friends, I 
settled down to cramming in earnest on June 1. Very 
soon my weeks fell into a barely tolerable routine. 
From Monday to Friday, I went to work from 8:00 a.m. 
till 5:00 p.m. every day. My husband, Dan, greeted me 
at the door each evening, cooked supper, did the dishes, 
and spoke very little. I thanked him occasionally and 
otherwise ignored him. 6:00 each evening I would leave 
our apartment, coffee mug in hand, and drive to the 
Minnesota bar review lecture. By 10:30, I was back home, 
reviewing my notes at the dining room table until mid-
night, my husband already asleep by himself. 
On weekends, we two locked ourselves into Dan's 
office at the University of Minnesota. I read bar review 
materials and condensed enormous outlines of The Law 
into fewer and fewer pages (I do not know what he did). 
By the last Tuesday of July, I was as ready as I could ~e. 
We drove to Illinois-that is, Dan drove; I studied 
criminal procedure-and checked into the Best Western 
near the airport (I had declined invitations to stay 
with friends, knowing I would be a les than pleasant 
1 In mo t tate , Illinoi included , the tate supreme court e tablishe 
bar admi sion requirements having the force of law, with the advice 
of a committee composed of member of the tate bar. 1 comment 
in thi article are addre ed chiefly to m own experience with the 
Illinoi bar exam . However, the procedures and cope of the exam are 
very imilar in every tate. 
The Cresset 
The bar examination conceives of the law as a list of rules, filed neatly in the lawyer 's brain , 
and tests a way of knowing the law which a good lawyer not only does not use but should not use. 
guest). I took Day One of the exam on Tuesday with 
hundreds of well-prepared examinees who scared me to 
death , and cried all the way back to the motel that 
afternoon. By Day Two, I was demoralized into numb-
ness. My celebration Wednesday evening was tinged 
with fear that I had ruined my summer studying, but 
had not passed. I was not really free of that fear until 
the results were mailed in the middle of October. 
The bar exam is conducted twice a year in almost 
every state, once in February and once in July. In 
Illinois, the exam consists of six hours of testing on 
each of two consecutive days. On the first day, candi-
dates are required to write answers to 16 essay questions, 
drawn from some 20 areas of the law. For each question, 
a hypothetical set of facts is described and the candi-
date is allowed approximately 22 minutes to advise the 
client or render a decision or make an argument under 
Illinois law. For example: 
Thaddeus executed his will , leaving the family farm to Adam and 
his diamond ring to Beulah . Before Thaddeus died , he sold the farm 
and lost the diamond ring. The money which Thaddeus received 
for the farm can be traced to a bank deposit. On Thaddeus' death , 
Adam claims the proceeds from the sale of the farm , and Beulah 
claims the executor of Thaddeus ' will should pay her the value of 
the ring. Is the claim of either valid? Give reasons. 
The following day, ai multiple-choice examination, 
The Multistate Bar Exa}ll,. prepared by the Educational 
Testing Service, is administered. In this segment of 
the exam, candidates are again presented with brief 
descriptions of facts but _1now are asked to select the best 
or worst of four possible short answers to one or more 
questions concerning the factual situation. This segment 
of the bar exam covers six major areas of the law: con-
tracts, torts, property, evidence, criminal law and 
procedure, and constitutional law. If wills were a sub-
ject covered in this portion of the exam, the candidate 
might, as a crude example, be asked to choose the best 
from the following answers to the question presented 
above: 
A. Adam is entitled to the money because it can be t raced directly 
from the sale of the farm, but Beulah will take nothing because 
of the doctrine of ademption. 
B. The gifts to both Adam and Beulah have adeemed ; neither 
claim is valid. 
C. Both Adam and Beulah are entitled to the money they seek 
because the probate court will do its best to enforce the testator's 
intent. 
D. one of the above answers is correct. 
I was not surprised to discover that the torment of 
weeks spent studying was far more painful than the two-
day examination itself. What did come a a very un-
pleasant surprise, however, was that the bar exam bore 
little relation to the study of law in law school. Ba ed 
on my admittedly limited experience in the law, and 
informal "interviews" with friends , I would argu 
further that the exam does not te t the body of knowl-
edge and skills needed by a practicing lawyer. 
April 1981 
I will present two major criticisms of the bar examina-
tion. First, the exam tests rote memory of a body of 
broad and irrelevant information. It seems to proceed 
from a primitive conception of the law as a list of rules, 
filed neatly in the lawyer's brain, governing a myriad 
of subject areas, many of them obscure. The body of 
facts and rules which the prospective lawyer is required 
to absorb range from the elementary and essential to 
the patently absurd. How likely is it , for example, that 
a 1981 lawyer will need to know the personal property 
rules governing the capture and escape of wild animals? 
Yet these rules I carefully memorized, for they ap-
peared in the bar review outline, which turned out to 
be an astonishingly accurate predictor of the topic 
tested. The exam itself asked me how many day ' no-
tice to the shareholders are required for a particular 
corporate meeting. As you might imagin , I trained 
to remember the answer during the exam, and hav no 
idea what it is now. But I can a ur you th at I ould 
find the answer in five minute in a libra ry, and v n 
if I did remember it , I would n t advi a Ii nt with-
out double-checking to be sur . 
The Test Misrepresents the Law 
r; \ 
courag d m 
d to I ctur 
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An unpleasant surprize of the bar examination is that it bears little relation to the study 
of law in law school or the body of knowledge and skills needed to be a practicing lawyer. 
memorizing rules that were in ome cases outdated, 
almost invariably oversimplified and often incorrect. 
I voiced my suspicions and concern to a friend who had 
pas ed the New York bar exam, reputedly one of the 
most difficult. "That' great," he reassured me. "When 
you realize the outline is wrong, you're really ready." 
The wrongness of the bar review outlines is a natural 
result of any effort to "freeze" the law into lists of rules 
and pat answers-which leads me to a second, more 
important criticism of the bar exam: that it tests a way 
of knowing the law which a good lawyer not only does 
not use but should not use. The law is dynamic; it is not 
pat. New rules, and new exceptions to old rules, are 
evolving concepts. Representations that the law is a 
fixed body of doctrines are misrepresentations. 
The bar exam asks the candidate to do something a 
responsible lawyer would never do: provide· the client 
with an off-the-top-of-the-head answer from a cookbook 
of fixed rules, without taking the time to think, explore, 
or even double-check. This is malpractice, by almost 
any definition. An effective lawyer may have little 
working knowledge of the rules. Instead, he or she 
knows how to locate the source of a rule or answer, or 
deduce from a number of sources what the proper rule 
must be, or create and argue for the value of a new rule. 
The bar exam makes no attempt to evaluate an individ-
ual's skills at finding or creating the law; therefore, 
persons who lack such skills, but who can memorize 
rules, can be deemed qualified to practice law. 
Questions on the essay portion of the bar exam are 
designed to trigger immediate responses which the 
candidate can retrieve from memory without thinking, 
if he or she has studied the bar review materials. Worse, 
the Multistate portion of the exam asks that the candi-
date select from four pre-designed ways of answering 
each question, an activity which bears no relation at all 
to a lawyer's daily work. This multiple-choice game 
presents little to justify it. Ostensibly, it makes for 
standardization of the requirements for bar admission 
among the fifty states because bar examiners in one 
state should accept a passing score earned on the Multi-
state taken elsewhere. In fact, however, few states have 
been willing to honor extra-territorial scores. The use-
lessness of the Multistate stands as a tribute to the 
parochialism of state bar examiners, even as they seek 
an easily quantifiable, machine-scorable method of 
measuring what are clearly not quantifiable skills. 
It becomes distressingly obvious that preparation for 
both sections of the bar examination encourages medi-
ocrity. Creative legal thinking is actively discouraged 
by the review course instructors. During my final days 
of preparation, my friend who took the New York bar 
stressed upon me a le son he had learned from a New 
York lecturer: When you write your bar exam e ay 
answer, he told me do not be original, in ightful, or 
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even deeply thoughtful. The effort for the bar exam is 
not to impress the corer with your intelligence. What 
you want to do is write the answer which will raise no 
eyebrows, which might put the corer to leep. You want 
to require the scorer to do no thinking at all, to see 
your answer as another of the passable majority. His 
advice was well-taken. I strove to write the same facile, 
largely thoughtless drivel that everyone else, who took 
the same course and memorized the same outlines as I, 
would write. 
Because of the breadth of its scope, and because of 
the intense pressure surrounding the exam, a signifi-
cant, albeit small, number of perfectly intelligent and 
capable individm,i.ls fail to pass it. In this regard, it is 
important to note that for everyone, those who pass as 
well as those who do not, the bar exam is truly a no-win 
proposition. Because, in most states, the percentage 
who pass is significantly greater than 50 (more than 75 
per cent passed the Illinois bar exam conducted last 
July), passing earns little congratulations from one's 
peers. Failing, on the other hand, brings humiliation. 
The Test Scores the Unquantifiable 
From the first day of the bar exam to the day I heard 
the good news, I was terrified of failure. At least in 
part, my terror was engendered by the comments of 
others at the law firm where I was already employed as 
an attorney. The firm's librarian explained that she 
would allow me to use her own library card at the local 
bar association library until I passed the bar exam, 
was admitted to the bar, and could get a card of my own. 
"Until and if," I corrected her. She laughed and re-
plied, "Oh, of course you'll pass. Our people always 
do!" (In fact, not true. One person at our firm, a bril-
liant and very capable attorney, did not pass the exam 
the first time he took it. This failure did not, to the 
firm's credit, prevent him from becoming a partner.) 
Another associate voiced her nagging doubts about 
her performance on the exam to a senior partner, who 
told her, "Whatever you do, don't flunk. It will follow 
you around for the rest of your life." (In fact, true, in 
my judgment. Newspaper and magazine columns have 
noted that one of then-Governor Ronald Reagan's 
appointees to the California Supreme Court failed to 
pass the bar exam 'in his first attempt. The implication 
seems always to be that his qualifications for the job he 
holds now, decade later, are open to doubt. My firm, 
it is true, made its one "failure" a partner. But nobody 
here seem to have forgotten that he did not pass in-
itially.) 
Like any attorney, I have probably over tated my 
case here. Obviou ly the practicing bar ha an obli-
gation to creen the illiterate, the ill-prepared, and the 
actually incompetent from tho e who are admitted to 
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practice, and the present bar exam does perform that 
function, if it was not performed by the rigors of law 
school. Furthermore, there is a plausible argument 
that it might be unfair for the bar examiners to ask more 
challenging, thought-provoking essay questions because 
greater numbers of qualified people, who somehow 
failed to pick up good test-taking .skills in law school 
or who "clutch" on exams, would not pass. But I do 
believe the exam could be designed in a way which 
would more effectively evaluate the lawyer's most nec-
essary skills. Ideally, in my view, candidates might be 
presented with a complex pattern of facts, and given 
several hours in a law library to research and construct 
an argument or opinion. Conceding that it might be 
prohibitively costly to administer such an examination 
to the more than 2200 individuals who took the Illinois 
exam last July, I still maintain that a better format 
than the current one could be devised. 
First, I consider it simply unnecessary to require 
candidates to memorize rules, particularly in areas of 
the law that are largely governed by statute, such as 
federal taxation, commercial law, and corporation law. 
To test candidates in these areas, the examiners could 
provide printed copies of relevant statutes, and ask that 
candidates write arguments that a particular statute 
does and that it does not dictate a given result in a given 
fact situation. In areas such as contracts and torts, where 
the rules evolve more from case law than from statutes, 
the bar examiners might consider providing the exam-
inees with copies of several cases and asking them to use 
the principles of law established by those cases to make 
effective arguments on both sides of a question presented 
by hypothetical facts. In such a way, the candidate could 
demonstrate much more than his rote memory of a rule-
he could show that he can analyze facts with reference 
to statutory language or case law, and make a sound and 
persuasive argument. 
Of course, 22 minutes is not enough time to respond 
to a well-designed question of the type I have pro-
posed. The solution to this problem is (a) to test fewer 
subject areas of the law, or test more than one area 
within each question (better than the present one ques-
tion-one subject area format, anyway, because "real 
life" legal problems raising issues in only one area do 
not often present themselves), and (b) to use the time 
freed up by dropping the Multistate Bar Examination, 
an exercise in memorization for which I can posit no 
real justification. 
The suggestions I have made here may well be dif-
ficult and expensive to implement. But unless the bar 
examination is made to test kills which more do ely 
approximate those of an effective practicing attorney, 
I submit that it does a profound disservice not only to 
those who must take it but to tho e whom the candi-
date who pass the bar are licen ed to repre ent. Cl 
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J. Barrie Shepherd 
Christianity itself is not a dispassionate matter, for it is a cohesion of faith 
and reason in which theological tenets held to be true are also felt to be true. 
The Passion of Belief and Passion in Literature 
Sentiment, 
Sentimentality, 
and Form John H. Timmerman 
"Before writing," wrote icolas Boileau in The Art of 
Poetry, "learn how to think." 1 I like hi advice; and it is 
the sort of thing I would want to say to a Freshman Com-
po ition class except for the fact that they are required 
to write six papers. 
Boileau's comment, however, was not an admonition 
to clarity; it was an injunction to rational scrutiny. 
"Love reason," he added, "let all that you write borrow 
both its luster and its worth from her alone."2 Boileau 
wrote from deep within the iron framework of the En-
lightenment with its insistence that ideas must be sub-
jected to systematic analysis to be considered true. 
Writing was not so much a means of exploring what 
might be true as it was a means of setting forth what 
Reason had determined to be indisputably true. Before 
a word found breathing space on the page it passed 
through the acid bath of analytic scrutiny. The word, 
each word, had to carry its freight of meaning through 
that bath. Then, stripped hard and clean, the word 
found its proper place on the page. 
A shining, pure beauty marks much writing from the 
Enlightenment era. A potent mind at work with words 
can produce exquisite sharpness and brilliant clarity. 
Writing exercised as Boileau suggests can effect the kind 
of beauty Plato praised in Hippias Major: effectiveness 
toward some good end, and Plato's good end was service 
to the ideal state. So it is also that Boileau's injunction 
to think before writing is followed by this qualification: 
"Never offer the reader anything incredible."3 The good 
end for Boileau is service to the expression of ration-
ally approved truths. 
The subject matter of this discussion is the relation-
ship between the calculated, well-conceived, carefully 
articulated, rational work and the incredible realm of 
human sentiment. But first, it may be reasonable to set 
forth several of the prejudices this writer brings to the 
subject. 
Like Emily Dickinson, I like to see a word well chosen; 
but also I like to see it frolic, play, and gain a life of its 
1 icolas Boileau, The Art of Poetry, selection reprinted in Boileau: 
Selected Critici m, trans. Ernest Dilworth ( ew York : Bobbs-Merrill , 
1965), p. 15. 2 Jbid., p. 12. 3 Jbid. , p. 25 . 
John H. Timmerman teaches in the English Department of 
Calvin College and is editor of Christianity and Literature. 
His publications include a recent book, Frederick Manfred: 
A Bibliography and Publi bing Hi tory, and a forth-
coming volume of poetry, Dancing on Water. 
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own on the page and in the eye, ear, and mind of the 
reader. In that respect, I am something like e e cummings. 
Afraid of the "incredible unanimal manunkind," he 
wanted to find room for the incredible animal mankind 
to flex its emotional muscles in a poem. I like to see 
this even if it means that the occasional word ill-chosen, 
dropped carelessly from a pen like a new kid in the 
neighborhood, joins in the game. Convinced at once of 
the soundness of Boileau's advice as it informs careful 
writing habits, I like to leave the door ajar for linguis-
tic serendipity. Sometimes, wrote Frost in "Mowing," 
a poem about writing poetry, we turn up "pale orchises" 
or "startle a bright green snake" in the hard work of 
making hay. While few or no one will take exception to 
this admiration for lively writing and some stylistic 
daring, some readers may take exception to the weight 
I give to the expression of human sentiment in that 
writing. 
Sentimentality, it seems, has become a modern acid 
test in evaluation of Christian writing. If the critic can 
ferret out the lightest tug on human emotion, he rejects 
the work. It is, to my mind, a test with dangers and pos-
sible error. My effort here will be to isolate the legiti-
mate dangers of sentimentality in an effort to free the 
use of human sentiment. 
I use the phrase "Christian writing" deliberately, 
recognizing at once that it is dangerous usage. Yet, it 
seems to lie at the heart of the issue here, for sentimen-
tality is often and wrongly thought to be a nearly in-
herent trait of such writing. I have never read a critic, 
Christian or otherwise, . who considered Nietzsche's 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra a sentimental work. Yet I agree 
with Walter Kaufmann that Zarathustra can only be 
understood properly when one understands that it is 
the work of a man suffering from incredible loneliness 
who writes out of and with all the pathos of his loneli-
ness.4 We call Zarathustra many things, but none dare 
call it sentimental. Yet it is, unabashedly, a welter of 
emotion and melodrama. 
To be fair to !he issue, then, we have to arrive at some 
under tanding of terms. As the issue applies to the 
Chri tian writer, I want to remain true fir t to the ety-
mology of sentimentality. Derived from the Latin root 
word for feeling the word may be taken to mean an ex-
pre ion of human feelings. I include with this expres-
4 ee the "Tran lator' Preface" to Friedrich ietz che . Thu poke 
Zarathustra, tran . \ alter Kaufmann ( ew York : iking Pre , 
1966). 
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sion those passionately held convictions of what is held 
by the writer to be true or false. The pejorative impli-
cation of the word in Latin, as now in English, is that 
sentiments are feelings which make easy claims for life 
and that these claims are often unreasonable or untrue 
to the nature of life itself. We may say, then, that senti-
mentality is the belief that the feeling is true to life 
when in fact it may be unreasonable or untrue.5 We 
become nervous about having tough realities reduced 
to easy cliches, and rightfully so. If the Christian is 
going to work to redeem this world as bearer of Christ's 
redemptive message, he had better understand the life 
to which he hopes to speak. 
Christian Writing and the Engaged Life 
Two implications, it seems to me, follow upon this 
understanding. First, Christian writing, which I define 
for the purposes of this article simply as writing in the 
fine arts by Christians, seems inherently susceptible to 
the charge of sentimentality by virtue of the fact that 
writing by Christians is always preceded by a supposi-
tional framework that necessarily affects all areas of 
consideration within that framework. A Christian ob-
serves life with certain feelings about the life he ob-
serves. A Christian cannot be the neutral observer that 
Emile Zola, in his essay "The Experimental Novel," 
declared the writer must be. Zola argued that the writer 
must be only a scientist, an analyst, an anatomist; and 
his work must have the certainty, the solidity, and the 
practical application of a work of science.6 The Christ-
ian writer, as Flannery O'Connor observed, does attempt 
to perceive all that is life, but he sees life in a certain 
way. And everyone, in the final analysis, does see life 
in a certain way. 
Second, Christianity itself strikes me as a matter of 
sentiment: a cohesiveness of reason and faith in which 
theological tenets held to be true are also felt to be true. 
This "feeling" consists of more than rational argu-
ments for Christianity's being true. It is the work of the 
Holy Spirit convicting one that Christianity is true. It 
is holding this conviction that Christianity is true with 
all one's heart, and mind, and strength.7 Furthermore, 
it is a matter of practicing one's belief in works of love. 
5 For example, a newly converted person who has found for the first 
time a refreshing joy in life might exclaim. " Life is just a bowl of 
cherries." While we would not call into question the person' new-
found joy , we would say nonetheless that the person's statement 
"Life is just a bowl of cherries"- meaning that life itself is joyful 
and good and bright and shining like cherries- is a proposition that 
is not exclusively true of life. Christianity may provide th e P ace 
that passes understanding. but it is nonetheless true that to follow the 
way of Chri t in this life may be quite difficult. 
6 Emile Zola. "The Experimental ovel" p880 ] in Th e Expen·mental 
ovel & Other Essays( ew York · Cas ell . 1893 ). 
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That welding bond between reason and faith is a pas-
sionate and active commitment to what one believes to 
be true that is evidenced in deeds. Thus, life is not 
merely observed; it is actively engaged. 
To the dispassionate humanism of our naturalistic 
age, I suppose, that makes pre-eminent bad sen e. The 
naturalist disavows all religion as sentiment only. The 
Christian recognizes sentiment as a part of that body-
soul unity given to him by God. If given by God, pre-
sumably it has a use and purpose. One might say even 
that God expects it to be u ed and the purpo e of thi 
use is to honor God. The issue at hand however, i an 
aesthetic one. An aesthetic work i uniqu by virtue of 
the fact that it is a work of fine art. A work of fine art 
is peculairly man's making, and while it may b en-
riched by God-given gifts which provide th work with 
aesthetic excellences, it i not God' making but man' , 
arising peculiarly out of human on ciou n s. F r th 
matter at hand, then, I would a rt that whil nti-
ment is a significant part of Chri tian b li f it do 
not necessarily follow that human art makin ncoura 
it. The question that face u i und r what onditi n 
is the expression of human entim nt a bad thin r an 
aesthetic defect in art makin and und r what ndi-
tions may it be a good thing. 
By adumbrating some implicati n · 
Christian tradition , I do n t m an t 
in mbarra m n . 
n 
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The question that faces us is: under what conditions is the expression of human 
sentiment an aesthetic defect and under what conditions is it an aesthetic virtue} 
neighborhood. Mo t notorious was Trollope who ar-
gued in his Autobiography that the novel presents ob-
ject le sons in conduct-all the while attempting to 
amuse the reader. The writer, to Trollope's mind, 
should try to slip a neat moral, like a post-hypnotic 
suggestion, through to the reader. For both Mill and 
Trollope, the novel is conceived in utilitarian terms, 
except that for Mill it was not useful enough and for 
Trollope it had only a limited and moralistic use. 
The contrast between Mill and Trollope, essayist 
and novelist, is a useful one for revealing the contra-
dictions which we bring to writing. Our expectations 
vary and we judge the worth of a single work insofar 
as it satisfies our expectations. Clearly, however, there 
are some standards which are broader than individual 
expectations. s 
The issue may be magnified and rarified by the con-
voluted path of literary tradition; which suggests, per-
haps, that resolution is impossible if we insist that the 
issue be an either/or for sentiment or no sentiment. 
Can one make a case in which the judicious use of senti-
ment in Christian writing is not only appropriate but 
in fact is a value that enhances the written work? 
If one is to make that case, he must begin with the 
consideration that the writer is conscious of an audi-
ence. The literary artist is not writing for himself. An 
aesthetic work, a work of fine art, assumes an audience 
for that work. Here is precisely where the issue of 
sentiment enters in, and this is the difference we must 
recognize. Sentimentality contains its own end. It is 
merely spectacle, in which the writer writes for himself 
and puts his sentiment on display. While a wholly pas-
sionate expression for the writer, the passion is the end 
of the matter. The work serves the passion or sentiment 
itself. Its sole excuse for being there is to provide a 
vehicle which brings the sentiment to view. Sentiment 
in its positive end goes beyond mere display of emotion 
to reveal to us, the audience, something about the 
mystery we are. The work provides an experience that 
discloses us to ourselves. Put quite simply, this means 
that if the Christian writer is to tell a story, the story 
must come first. It should not begin and end in an emo-
tional spectacle. I qualify the matter in that in the 
telling of the story I would want to see some passion 
enter it. 
To a growing body of critics that wish is a monstrous 
error, for they would discount any expression of senti-
ment as an aesthetic defect. They would have us be only 
recorders of experience, in the mold of Zola. I believe 
Lionel Trilling accurately assessed such criticism in 
his boo~ Sincerity and Authenticity: 
8 1n his Art in Action: Toward a Chn· tian Ae thetic (Grand Rapids : 
Eerdmans, 1980), icholas Wolterstorff discu es criteria of ae thetic 
excellence. 
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The doctrine of the impersonality of the artist was loyally seconded 
by the criticism that grew up with the classic modern literature. 
In its dealings with personality this criticism played an elaborate, 
ambiguous , and arbitrary game. While seeking to make us ever 
more sensitive to the implications of the poet's voice in its unique 
quality , including inevitably those implications that are personal 
before they are moral and social, it was at the same time very strict 
in its insistence that the poet is not a person at all, only a persona, 
and that to impute to him a per anal existence is a breech of literary 
decorum.9 
If, as I have argued, the Christian view of life is not a 
dispassionate and neutral view, I would expect to see 
the writing which flows from this view of life to be im-
pelled by some passion and conviction of its truth. To 
long-standing criteria of aesthetic excellence such as 
coherence, completeness, internal richness, fittingness, 
and others, I would add passionate conviction revealed 
in sentiment. The Christian artist, to my mind, should 
no more be the dispassionate voyeur than he should be 
the person who tosses restlessly in a bed of emotion. But 
the work itself should be impelled by a passion of con-
viction. It should not merely record; it should direct. 
It should not merely pose an irresolvable dilemma; 
it should suggest alternatives. 
Five Categories of Sentimentality 
Obviously the expression of sentiment is not neces-
sarily and at once sentimental. And if expression of 
sentiment may be a good thing, under what conditions 
may it be the bad thing of sentimentality? To free us 
from our fear of any expression of human sentiment, 
which is an expression of feelings and not of opinion 
or fact, it is necessary to develop some criteria by which 
to answer that question. I suggest five conditions under 
which sentiment becomes sentimentality. 
1. When an action or emotion is inappropriate to or 
inadequately sustained by the context. While it may be 
appropriate for a college senior to have her babyhood 
teddy bear perched on the pillow of her dorm bed, it 
would be inappropriate for her to write her senior 
honors paper on her affection for her teddy bear. In 
much writing sentimentality of the sort in this category 
comes with a rude suddenness, like an exclamation 
mark (which is also sentimental) flashed in the face of 
the reader. Sudden and exorbitant grief over the death 
of an ant on th~ sidewalk, without a sustaining context 
in the work, may be simply embarrassing to a reader, 
like opening the door on an undressed person. 
2. When the emotion expressed is effusive. Some-
times such emotion is unrestrained self-glorification 
in which the ' I" of the writer struts in a psychological 
trip-tease. Or, it may be a psychological valve blowing 
off a boiler of pent-up emotion. Thi category i marked 
9 Lionel Trilling, incerity and Authenticity (Cambridge: Harvard 
niver ity Pre . 1971 ), p. 8. 
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by a lack of re traint and context without which any 
writing suffers. I mean by restraint the same thing Willa 
Cather meant when she wrote in "My First Novels" 
that "Too much detail is apt, like any other form of 
extravagance, to become slightly vulgar ... ".10 If you 
substitute the word "emotion" for Cather's "detail" 
I would call the result the same-vulgar. 
I am of the same mind as Irving Babbitt that emo-
tional sloppiness obliterates a clear view of life. Ob-
jurgating Rousseauistic sentimentality, Babbitt writes 
that "This subordination of all other values of life to 
sympathy is achieved only at the expense of the great 
humanistic Virtue-decorum or a sense of propor-
tion."11 Babbitt calls for an ordered view of life, with-
out which one "becomes subject to every influence," 
and argues that life should be governed by "Good 
sense," which he defines as "a correct perception of the 
ordinary facts of life and of their relation to each 
other."12 Sentimentality of the type in this category 
violates good sense by placing the effusiveness of emo-
tion over the "ordinary facts of life and their relation 
to each other." 
3. When one places "sincerity" over "authenticity." 
Effusive expression of emotion may sometimes be ex-
cused by an author as a sincere expression of what he 
felt. It does not necessarily follow that because the ef-
fusion is sincere it is therefore meritorious in the writ-
ing. Rather, the writing may be called sentimental if 
its ostensible purpose is only to express a sincere or 
intensely held emotion. But surely, one might rejoin, 
good sincere writing is preferable to sham writing or 
what we may also call whimsical, uncontrolled, lazy 
writing. Lionel Trilling has expertly dealt with this 
issue of sincerity in its historical, literary context in 
Sincen:ty and Authenticity. Sincerity, in Trilling's esti-
mation, has degenerated in the modern age to a kind 
of artistic solipsism. "To thy own self be true" i the 
blithe maundering of sincerity that denies the real 
life that the self must sooner or later find itself in. In 
place of sincerity, Trilling offers authenticity, a 
straightforward grappling with life. 
Sincerity once carried the meaning of "true" or "un-
tampered with." An expert at the wine-snifter i thor-
oughly right when he use a one of hi criteria 'a 
incere wine"-meaning that natural aging proce e 
are not alloyed or assisted by chemical timulant . In 
literary analysis the word came to have the meaning of 
"the absence of di simulation or feigning or pr -
tence."13 Thus, the word ha frequently erved a an 
IO\! ilia Cather, " y Fir t ovel . " On Writing ( ew York lfr d · 
Knopf. 1953), p. 97. 
11 Babbitt , Rou seau & Romanticism ( leveland · eridian B k , 
1947), p. 120. 12 /bid., p. 140 
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excuse for the rawest exposure of any private wound 
or, as was said in the sixties, "to let it all hang out." 
Don't feign or hold back or hide; but let the true-sincere 
self emerge through the cultural restraints that man ha 
devised. In effect, when it all hung out incerity be-
came sentimentality. The expo ure it elf, once again, 
is the sole purpose of such writing. 
I find it peculiar that Henri Peyre in hi encyclo-
pedic Literature and Sincerity, find thi a predominantly 
French trait. In Peyre's e timation, French arti t have 
understood sincerity as telling the truth about on elf 
without any restrictions of morality or good ta t . Whil 
I find the trait far more univer al than P yr do it 
just might be possible to go further with hi premi 
and say it is equally offen iv to l t ry truth about 
one's religious life fall on th pa · without any r tri -
tions of morality or ood ta t . Ev ry writ r ha th 
responsibility to exerci e om and that 
responsibility ari e from a kin what do I 
want to ay, but al o how d aff t m 
reader's sen ibilitie . rt1 t1 r d n t 
stop at the point of the author' p n. 
Sentimentality in Literary Context 
13Trillin • p 13. 
14 Ib,d . p 11 
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An outward vision in which passionat e conviction is not onl y permissible but commendable 
calls for tough and resilient forms that actually carry t he freight of the vision out ward. 
to reduce it to neat little package of an wer . It bring 
an a y olution to unea y tension in modern life. 
Example of thi category are I think, readily evident 
and need not be elaborated here at length. The danger 
of uch ea y an wer lies not so much in the fact that 
they don't see the whole complex of the life situation, 
nor in the fact that they are often ha ty and uperficial, 
but in the fact that they reduce the energy of life to the 
frozen realm of the cliche. Simplification applies a 
bandaid to a gaping wound and then pretends the wound 
i no longer there. Sometimes one has to probe the 
wound, clean it out, sort through grit, suture torn 
fie h; in short-get bloodied in the process. But that 
is how genuine healing is effected. It is not the easy, 
aseptic way. But the easy way denies man's human 
nature by failing to contend with that mes ier side of 
man that is his spiritual wound. 
I call this simplification unattainable because easy 
answers to life's problems are not often genuine answers. 
There are quick solutions; but they are cover-ups and 
not a cure. 
5. When resolution is given in a "Great Good Place." 
Irving Babbitt isolates this trait as one marking the 
Rousseauist (whom Babbitt identifies as "the scientist, 
a specialist-he specializes in his own sensations"), 
and identifies it as the "longing for Arcadia" in which 
"The essence of the mood is always the straining of the 
imagination away from the here and now from an ac-
tuality that seems paltry and faded compared to the 
radiant hues of one's dreams."15 On this point, Babbitt 
contrasts the classicist who "is for making the most of 
the present" and the romanticist who "hovers between 
recollection and hope. In Shelleyan phrase 'he looks 
before and after and pines for what is not.' "16 
This longing for the "Great Good Place" is not only 
the Romantic dream. Pervasive through all history it 
also insinuates its way into theologies. Nor has Chris-
tianity remained free from this perversion of one of its 
most treasured doctrines: the translation of man to his 
glorified state in the very presence of God in heaven. 
This doctrine is perverted when heaven is considered a 
mere escape from life's sorrows and when we begin to 
think for a moment that we can blithely ignore this life 
because we are headed for a "Great Good Place." 
These, then, I take to be some manifest examples of 
sentimentality. The tension that develop in each is 
that of the inward vision versus the outward vision. 
Sentimentality results from the inward vision that is 
locked up in the human person. The outward vision 
u es human pa sion or commitment to omething, as 
a means to engage life and bring to it a radical ignif-
15 Babbitt, p. 83 . 
16 Ibid. 
14 
icance. The outward vision will express sentiments in 
writing. It does not engage the world with torpid ennui. 
While sentimentality fairly demands that the reader 
react in a certain way, the careful use of sentiment may 
uggest to the reader a possibility of reaction but leaves 
the reader free to make that choice. 
The inward versus the outward vision is consonant 
to the central Christian doctrines of the crucifixion 
and the resurrection; one freeing man from sin the other 
freeing man for living a life in the pattern of Christ. 
Man is freed for certain actions in this world, and those 
actions include the act of writing. In this writing which 
is freed for, outwardly directed, the writer need not be 
nervous about the use of human passion. He should be 
nervous about exclusive claims upon the use of that 
passion. 
Toward Freer Forms for Sentiment 
Here, more than ever, we have to conceive of written 
expression as a living and dynamic body in which each 
idea, or each passion, seeks its fitting form. This may 
even demand radical new forms, and also demand our 
critical patience in assessing such forms. I would like 
to see greater concern, both by Christian critics and 
artists, not only with formal technique but also with 
style. Form in this case refers to the mode of presenta-
tion, and style refers to the rhetorical energy of the 
presentation. The form is the vehicle, the style the 
physical adumbration of passionately held beliefs. 
To take one case in point, I am bothered less by the 
writer who poses his or her religious beliefs and pas-
sions openly in a poem, than I am with the fact that 
that writer poses them in the silliest sing-song meters 
and annoying rhymes and cloying diction conceivable. 
The offense here is the form. If I call for an outward 
vision in which passionate conviction is not only per-
missible but commendable, I call also for a tough, re-
silient form that can actually convey the vision outward. 
If form is a vehicle, all too often it merely huffs and 
puffs in neutral rather than conveys the freight of 
meaning. 
In conclusion, then, I would reassert that sentiment 
in the sense of passionately held convictions can be a 
potent force in one's writing, but it must be outer-
directed, authentic to life and dealing with life. In an 
effort to so engage life, the writer must seek forms 
which are also outwardly directed, which work at once 
to eize and convey the energy of the entiment. The 
call then, i for vigorous metaphor tyli tic poli h 
that really parkles, and for harp clean patterns of 
poetic or compositional rhetoric. In hort a pa ion for 










Warren G. Rubel 
Unless your righteousness exceeds 
the righteousness of the scribes 
and p harisees, you will never 
enter the Kingdom of Heaven. 
Matthew 5 
Jesus seeks to take us 
to the actual reality 
behind the rules, away 
from public scrutiny and 
reciprocal surveillance, 
and to place us in a new 
force field where you 
and I are addressed 
by the living God. 
Warren G . Rubel is Professor of Humanities 
at Valparaiso University and the Director 
of the Special Program in the Humanities 
in Christ College. This academic year 
the Alumni Association of the University 
awarded Dr. R ubel its annual Distinguished 
Teaching A ward, and in June and July he 
will lecture dur£ng the "Stopover Weekends " 
of the Summer College for the Valparaiso 
University Alumni on "The Quest for the 
American Dream: Who Are the Dreamers?" 
INI 
Christ's words in this portion of the Sermon 
on the Mount are quick, disturbing, clean. Coming 
after the exaltation of the previous verses -you are 
the salt of the earth , you are a city set on a hill , 
you are the light of the world-the words disarm 
us. By these words Jesus takes us abruptly from the 
public eye to the interior eye of discipleship. Jesus 
does this not because the inside, our interior piety, 
is more important than the out ide, the world of 
public action. Rather Jesus bring us up harply 
to move us from our distorted view of righteou ne 
to that key passage that comes later:' Your heavenly 
Father knows what you need. But eek fir t hi kingdom 
and his righteousness, and all the e thing hall be 
yours as well." 
How do we get from the pos ibl_e de pair of 
excelling the righteousne of th crib and 
Pharisees to the impos ible hop of the right ou n 
of God? Our answer, we believ with t. Paul and 
all the saints before us, i in Chri t our L rd. 
He is our righteousnes . We liv b th right 
of his faith, by his cro s, hi re urr tion, hi 
life in us. Without him we futil ly · k to liv 
by the law. With him we liv a f r iv n inn r 
empowered through word and a ram bring th 
active, open, love of Chri t to b ar mmunity. 








walks to the 
altar where 
Christ attends 
to us in his 
righteousness 





Our predicament here before this portion of the 
text is something like the story told of Queen 
Elizabeth. As she grew older and more seasoned in 
her exercise of power and her familiarity with regal 
glory, she recognized the great gap between what 
she was as a human being and the significant role 
she played as English monarch. Wishing to be honest 
with herself, she had her private chamber completely 
covered with mirrors. There she saw herself as she 
was: a plain woman indeed, an aging queen, a fragile 
human being. Before she appeared in public, she 
commanded that all mirrors be covered. That way she 
was protected both from her vanity about her office 
and despair about her plainness. What she could do, 
before the curtained mirrors, was her work. 
With Jesus' intensifying of the law we are in a 
similar private chamber of mirrors. We see that the 
care of human life depends not merely on honoring 
the external command of the law, Thou shall not kill. 
We also see we cannot love God and hate our neighbor. 
Even our worship, unless it is going to be the worship 
of an idol, depends on that regard for the neighbor 
that sees him or her as one loved by God in his Son. 
We see that not only is the human family preserved, 
but for the disciple, man or woman, desire without 
love destroys a fundamental relationship with Christ. 
Discipline and constraint as well as purity of heart 
mark the most intimate of family relations. It i 
not that there shall not be desire, but that love 
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and desire give power to that purity which obeys the 
Lord who says, "You have heard that it was said, but 
I say to you." In a community which remains a genuine 
community, integrity and honesty mark the man and 
woman in such a way that nothing but ourselves under 
God needs to be called into question because to 
isolate any word or moment and to speak of it as true 
is to call into question the whole fabric of one's 
life. 
This intensification of the law in Jesus' own 
words could drive us to despair if he, the crucified 
King of glory, had not set our sins aside. They are 
nailed with him to the cross. But, if you will have 
it, Christ too is the curtain who covers us when we 
move into love and service in the community. But 
that usage is too static. "I am a sinner, I am a 
good sinner," said Leon Bloy. One always comes back 
to that. To be a forgiven sinner is never to relax 
the relationship between the living God and ourselves. 
But to be a forgiven sinner is always to have a new 
beginning-within the limits and possibilities of a 
given day. In those small undertakings that mark 
our daily life-there we hear and obey this Christ 
who attends to us in His righteousness. That way 
we can sing the kinds of hymns we sing about conscience 
and consciousness free from blame, take walks to the 
altar with many people in this Christian community 
where we seek to obey and to hear God's word for us 
in our work, where we remain transparent to the 
flame of light and glory that God gi e in hi on. Cl 
The Cresset 
New job opportunities for women may make it easier for the family to survive financially, 
but money is largely irrelevant to the survival of the family as an institution of intimacy. 
The Supreme Court and the Celebration of the Individual 
Dierdre A. Burgman 
By and large, American law has dwelled on the rights 
of individuals or on social well-being generally. Last 
year, however, the presidential campaign and the White 
House Conference on Families focussed nationwide 
attention on the fact that law has an impact on family 
life. That realization is a significant one. If we are con-
cerned with the preservation of the family unit as a 
worthwhile institution, we cannot close our eyes to the 
fact that the countless new statutes, regulations, and 
cases appearing each year are not simply relevant to 
individual lives, but affect as well the families of which 
those individuals are an intimate part. We must recog-
nize the family as an ordered, symbiotic network of 
interdependent persons, a sort of mini-government. 
The White House Conference coaxed us to contribute 
to the formulation of a national public policy of the 
family, presumably to inform the actions of the Presi-
dent and the Congress, and the Republican Party made · 
family life part of its political platform. 
This new and evangelical concern for the family is, 
of course, spurred by the perception that the family 
today is not what it once was. According to U.S. News & 
World Report, more than one-half of the mothers in 
this country work outside the home; eighteen million 
children live in "broken" homes; and the divorce rate 
is up 65.3 per cent from ten years ago. In the past de-
cade, more couples have chosen to have no children; 
most couples have chosen to have fewer children; and 
157.4 per cent more persons have chosen to live as 
couples without being married. Many choose never to 
marry at all. Some observers decry this state of affairs 
as a national crisis; others tell us it is a simple shift in 
priorities, thatthefamilyisonlychanginginappearance. 
Regardless of how it is characterized, the evolution 
portends a trend toward seeking individual fulfillment, 
or "happiness," rather than devoting one's life to the 
persistent challenge of making a group work. Even 
within remaining traditional "nuclear" families, living 
is not the same. We are exhorted daily to "do our own 
thing," to "pull our own strings." Our schools teach us 
commitment to career, not to family. The media teach 
Dierdre A. Burgman is Visiting Assistant Professor of Law 
in the School of Law at Valparaiso University and holds her 
B.A. and JD. from Valparaiso University. She is a member 
of the Indiana Bar and has served as clerk for the Honorable 
Paul H Buchanan, Jr., Chief Judge of the Indiana Court 
of Appeals. 
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In Search of Legal Identity for the Family 
us the virtues of self-esteem and independence. If life is 
brief, it should be lived "with gu to, ' and gu to re-
quires an absence of obligation. The antifamily enti-
ments of society, as Michael Novak term them, celebrate 
the individual and encourage his liberty. 
That celebration is a shift in moral a well a priori-
ties, and the law has acquie ced in it. Ind d, th law 
has sponsored it. The change in r cent y ar to "no-
fault" divorce is a sterling exampl : mo t tat 
have "reformed" their divorc law in ord r to 
divorce whenever one spou find th marria 
retrievably broken." The more than 2. 7 milli n m n nd 
women living together without marria e ar b n fit d 
in some states, by "palimony ' law : p r nal r lati n-
ships are thus subjected to imp r onal ntra t t rmin-
ology. Marriage for many ha b m am r allianc , 
and the law strain to that a h an 




Few would gainsay the idea that individuals should have rights apart from their families, 
and ethically we expect a family to respect the rights of each individual in the family. 
tablish a home, and bring up children" became consti-
tutionally protected in the early twentieth century. A 
case in 1923 recognized a right to have one's children 
taught the German language, despite state opposition; 
two years later, there was recognized a freedom to send 
one's children to a parochial school. These decisions 
laid the groundwork for a.famous case in 1972, wherein 
the Supreme Court ruled the Amish in Wisconsin had 
a right to withdraw their children from public schools 
at an earlier age than the state law permitted. The con-
stitutionalization of the rights inherent in the relationship 
between parent and child meant the state had to refrain 
from interjecting its will into certain areas of family 
decisions. 
A similar protection arose for marriage once the 
Court decided that states had gone too far in their regu-
lation of that relationship. In 1967 the <::ourt struck 
down a Virginia anti-miscegination statute making it 
criminal for a white person to marry a black person. 
The Court found the ,:ight to marry "fundamental," 
and therefore, only the most compelling reason for 
such a statute could save it from a declaration of consti-
tutional infirmity. Some observers believed the case 
dealt more with race discrimination than with mar-
riage, for marriage had forever been a legal status 
governed wholly by state laws. They thought the Court 
would continue to defer to the states in such matters, 
except when race discrimination was involved. This 
belief was dissolved just a few years ago, when the 
Court invalidated a Wisconsin law preventing a person 
with dependent children from remarrying without a 
showing that he was in compliance with his support 
obligations. That case illustrates well the evolution 
in outlook: the high Court conceded the state's interest 
in protecting dependent children, but held this could 
not be used to withhold a marriage license, for mar-
raige was so fundamental a right of the individual. 
The right of the individual thus superceded the in-
terests of the familial institution, and the state's concern 
for family welfare gave way to the federal government's 
traditional concern for individual rights. 
Nowhere has the shift from institutional rights to 
individual rights-a dichotomy noted by Justice Rehn-
quist- been so dramatic as in the cases on the right to 
privacy. Having recognized in 1965 a right to privacy 
inherent in the man·tal relationship-a right to make 
decisions regarding contraception-the Supreme Court 
subsequently held in Eisenstadt v. Baird that such a right 
inheres in the individual, as marriage is merely a combin-
ation of two individuals. According to this reasoning, 
a decision so significant as one "to bear or beget a child" 
is reserved to an individual, and a single person i 
thus as immune to government interference with that 
decision as is a married couple. Though hardly conso-
nant with the Christian view of marriage, the Eisen-
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stadt opinion· seemed reasonable. At the time, it served 
to prevent states from withholding sale of contracep-
tives to single persons, and consequently it forwarded a 
federal policy of birth control. Its ultimate impact, 
however, has been to set the law on a path of ordaining 
individual autonomy at the expense of the cohesive 
family unit. 
The Family as a Mini-Government 
In order to understand this denouement, it is neces-
sary to grasp one basic legal concept: no constitutional 
rights are violated unless government does the violating. 
In other words, there must be "state action," or govern-
ment involvement, before a constitutional mandate 
is triggered. Therefore, if certain decisions are left 
to the family, its internal dealings-patriarchal, matri-
archal, fair or unfair-are not constrained by any 
notion of "rights" outlined in the Constitution. When 
Dad tells Son he may not go out on Saturday night, Dad 
has not infringed Son's right to travel; and when he 
tells Daughter she should not have an abortion, he has 
not violated that right either. When Dad and Mom 
search for and find drugs in Son's room they have not 
impinged upon the fourth amendment proscription 
against warrantless searches and seizures. Nothing in 
the Constitution requires parents to respect the desires 
or autonomy of their children; nothing requires one 
spouse to acceed to the wishes of the other. If it is in 
fact a government, the family is a separate government 
making and enforcing its own rules. 
It is this separateness of the family as a mini-govern-
ment that poses the problem of a search for legal ident-
ity, as the state becomes increasingly forced to stay its 
hand in resolving family disputes. Once the state at-
tempts to back certain family decisions by supporting 
the view of one family member, it activates the Consti-
tution and so invalidates its own action. This new ap-
proach to non-intervention is explained by the Supreme 
Court as a theory of "delegation": inasmuch as the state 
itself may not interfere with the individual's procreative 
decision-making (Eisenstadt) , neither may it delegate 
that power to a private individual. Hence, the state 
cannot enact a law that gives a husband the right to 
veto his wife's aborting of their child; it cannot give 
him a legally enforceable power of consent. The right 
is the wife's alone, as an individual. Similarly, the 
state may not pass a law giving parents consent power 
for their daughter's having an abortion· the right is 
hers alone. With one broad stroke, the Supreme Court 
made each of these propositions the law in 1976 in 
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, which was 
oon followed by a determination that becau e they are 
individual under Eisenstadt, minors have a right of 
acce s to contraceptives. 
The Cresset 
At the same time we know that to experience a family is to experience order, discipline, 
and safety, and that marriage and family are about care and obligation more than rights. 
Dealing as it does with the question of abortion, the 
Dan/ orth opinion demonstrates the difficulty of a tie 
between two married people, but also the special dif-
ficulty when each of the two parties has serious interests 
at stake. How should such a problem be resolved? 
Having ruled earlier that a fetus is not a person, the 
Court could not say the vote would be two to one! In-
stead, the Court chose to say that because the woman 
bears the child, the decision is more personal to her. 
The same rationale was used to support the minor's 
decision to have an abortion, free of interference from 
her parents. The Danforth case has many supporters, 
and in its own way it appears quietly logical. Upon 
closer examination, however, it seems strained. First, 
the Court appeared to accept the argument of Planned 
Parenthood that the fetus might not even be that of the 
husband. This was in disregard of the nearly universal 
presumption that a child born during a marriage is 
that of the mother's husband. Second, the Court ignored 
the fact that every other form of surgery, unless in an 
emergency, would require the approval of the parents 
of the minor patient. Those who support Danforth argue, 
though, that the case is solely a pronouncement that the 
state must leave families to work out their problems 
among themselves. 
The Protection of Individual Choice 
Unfortunately, a more recent decision suggests that 
is not the case, as the individual's immunity from state-
backed family power is not limited to the context of 
consent power. That view of the Danforth principle 
assumes that families are aware of their internal prob-
lems, and such is not always true. Impelled by the 
momentum of Dan/ orth, the Court in 1979 held uncon-
stitutional a Massachusetts statute which provided an 
alternative to parental consent: the minor could apply 
to a court for a judicial determination that she was 
mature enough to make the judgment independently, 
but in that event her parents had to receive notification 
so that consultation would occur. The Court acknow-
ledged three reasons for declining to recognize minors 
as equal to adults: the peculair vulnerability of child-
ren; their inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed, mature manner; and the importance of the 
guiding role of parents. But the Court then aid the 
abortion decision differs from other decisions facing 
minors, so the state must act with "particular en iti-
vity" when it legislates to foster parental involvement 
in uch a decision. Ultimately the Court conclud d 
the statute violated a minor' constitutional right , 
for it required parental con ultation or notification 
in every case, even when a judge would decide the minor 
wa mature enough to make the deci ion alon . Par ntal 
con ultation, aid the Court might not alwa in 
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the child's best interests. Justice White, the single 
dissenter, found it "inconceivable" that parents should 
be barred from participation in the decision-making. 
The other eight members of the Court, though not in 
accord on the extent of the holding, agreed that the 
state's involvement in requiring notification was clearly 
unlawful delegation, an unwarranted interference 
with the individual's right to make uch a decision. 
A comment on that fact seems in order. Sociologists 
tell us the breakdown in family life derives in part 
from the mobility of our society. Life today i r tle , 
dispassionate, and distancing. We live fa t. We at 
fast food. We seldom take time to be tog th r, much 1 
talk together. To illustrate, one study in a Midw t rn 
city showed the average family ate to eth r only thr 
times a week. It would eem that a tat might w 11 
consider implementing a y tern wher by par nt 
would at least be made aware of imp ndin ru ial 
decisions by their children. To ay that th ab rti n 
decision differs from other d ci ion i p i u . Th r 
is hardly another decision hort of ui id , that uld 
have a more profound eff t up n a min r' lif : a art 
from the psychological trauma th r i a ibilit 
of permanent physical harm. In additi n th ab rti n 
decision seems one which for a mu h m r ubtl r a n 
should be committ d to family di i n: aft r 11 it 
is the government that ha pawn d th Ii 
of abortion; the gov mm nt pla 
schools and fundin in our aborti n 
1 
The law speaks of husbands, wives, and children as if they were unconnected to the family, 
and it says that in the real world is their freedom while in the home is their oppression. 
backing, a mere invertebrate entity that the state can-
not reinforce. 
To some extent, this seems alien to a great deal of 
other law regarding marriage and family, and the only 
explanation possible is that the national policy of 
birth control gives a new complexion to certain cases. 
In many states an annulment of marriage will be grant-
ed on grounds of fraud when one spouse refuses to have 
children, having agreed before the ceremony that 
children would be conceived. Notably, an annulment 
is a declaration that there never was a m_arriage, and 
the reason behind the rule is that the bearing of child-
ren goes to the heart of what marriage is about. Almost 
any other misrepresentation an indiv.idual could make 
would not warrant an annulment; the question is re-
solved, not on the basis on individual "rights," but on 
the basis of the concept of marriage. 
The state's traditional interest in the parent-child 
relationship and the functioning of the family also 
present a striking paradox. Most states, for example, 
permit parents to seek a court's help in controlling a 
delinquent child. This seems an obvious recognition 
that in some circumstances, parents need backing if 
they are to perform their important task of raising 
potentially responsible adults. In addition, state and 
federal courts have zealously protected parents whenever 
the state welfare authorities seek to take away a child in 
a neglect or child abuse proceeding. Some states go so 
far as to provide such parents with court-appointed 
counsel, deeming the possible sanction as just as harsh 
as a prison sentence. The burden of proof the state must 
carry in order to remove the child from the home is 
currently a hotly contested issue upon which the Su-
preme Court has now agreed to rule; the leading case 
holds that the standard must be "beyond a reasonable 
doubt," the highest level of proof and the same neces-
sary to prove a criminal charge. Innovatively adding 
another avenue for parents to contest the state's action 
in removing their children, one federal court recently 
ruled that a parent may seek federal habeas corpus 
relief against the state. The law uncompromisingly 
assumes that parents are best suited for the custody 
and care of their children, and the state bears a heavy 
burden in seeking to interfere with that relationship. 
"Best interests of the child" is normally the applicable 
standard in choosing between two parents for child 
custody upon divorce, but it is not generally associated 
with constitutional theory. While the history of Anglo-
American law has never been one of total consistency, 
these examples demonstrate the separate, enigmatic 
nature of the new laws of individual autonomy within 
the family. 
Nonetheless, the clear trend of Supreme Court action 
is toward the celebration of the individual. One notable 
illustration is the 1980 decision that a spouse is no longer 
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precluded from testifying against his or her spouse in a 
federal criminal prosecution. The privilege is lodged 
in the witness, not the defendant; so if a wife chooses 
to divulge what her husband has confided in her, that 
is her right. In support of its decision, the Court obser-
ved that the woman in our society is no longer destined 
for the home, but for the "marketplace and the world 
of ideas." Exactly why the new labor opportunities for 
women justify the abrogation of so ancient and honored 
a rule is not entirely clear. In fact, it could be asserted 
that the rule is more important today than ever before, 
if the marital relationship is to have any contrast with 
a mere sharing-of-space arrangement. If it is to remain 
a "haven in a heartless world," as Christopher Lasch 
calls it, the family should be a sanctuary for communi-
cation. Yet with the Supreme Court's decision, a man 
can now expect more enforced loyalty from his lawyer 
than from his wife. 
The Haven in a Heartless World 
That the Court focussed on the fem ale spouse as now 
an individual with equal opportunities may itself be a 
revelation abom: the new jurisprudence of autonomy. 
Those who extol the Burger Court for its treatment of 
the family point to numerous cases of the past decade 
involving equality of rights for women. In the area of 
Social Security benefits, for example, the Court has 
ruled that the working woman is entitled to expect the 
same protection as the working man. Likewise, a depen-
dent husband must be awarded alimony if a dependent 
wife would be. Such cases astutely diagnose the economic 
realities of a changing society. Some even surpass 
equality, suggesting government can legitimately favor 
women with greater benefits, to redress the inequalit-
ies long suffered in the labor market. These improve-
ments, however, should have nothing to do with the 
internal dealings of the family: monetary benefits 
may make it easier for a family to survive economically, 
but they are irrelevant to its survival as an institution 
of intimacy. To remove intimacy by exalting individ-
ualism is to remove the spirit of the relationship. 
Predictably, the Court has been quick to point out 
that there is scant intimacy or harmony left in a mar-
riage when a wife chooses to testify against her husband, 
or when she will proceed with an abortion despite his 
wishes. That is not the point. The point is that the action 
of the Court makes the disharmony irreparable, and it 
fosters disharmony in marriages where the issues have 
not yet ari en. Most significantly, it make a tatement 
about the nature and meaning of marriage itself. It 
erodes the distinction between marriage and non-mar-
riage, le ening the value of the relation hip and in-
crea ing the apparent comparative importance of the 
individual. 
The Cresset 
The law loads its argument for individual autonomy 
by speaking of us as if we are all atomic beings. 
Noone would gainsay the idea that individuals should 
have rights apart from their families. Ethically, we ex-
pect families to respect their constituent parts, and we 
know empirically what happens when they do not. We 
know today more than ever before the influence parents 
have on the futures of their offspring; we know, for 
instance, of the continuing nature. of child abuse, passed 
on from generation to generation like a genetic disease. 
We know the family can be a context for brutality and 
exploitation. We fear the "heavy mother," the drunken 
father. Each of us is keenly aware of the missed oppor-
tunities chargeable to his familial existence. At the 
same time, we know that to experience a family is to 
experience order, responsibility, discipline, and safety. 
We know that families and marriage are about care and 
obligation more than about rights. 
Writing on the notion of children's rights, a legal 
commentator recently observed that it was one he was 
thankfully spared in his own days of fatherhood. With 
the enforced sepa.rateness of family and state, this re-
mains a concept today's parent is also spared. The family 
is still its own self-contained government, despite lack 
of support on certain issues. Perhaps the parent's con-
cern today should be the new legal celebration of the 
individual and the potential of that celebration. The 
law teaches us that despite what parents say, children 
have rights. The law loads its arguments for individual 
automony by referring to children as "minors," as if 
they are no one's children. It speaks of wives as "indi-
viduals," of husbands as "individuals," as if we are all 
atomic beings, unconnected to any network. It informs 
us that in the real world there is freedom, while in the 
home there is oppression. The world becomes the haven, 
and few with this view of reality "'ill choose to become 
the next generation of oppressors. 
Some contend the family should expect no more of 
the law. Were the state to intercede, to place itself be-
hind intra-family authority, this would denigrate the 
family as a voluntary institution; respect should be 
accorded one's family for its own sake, quite apart 
from what the world teaches. There may be some truth 
to that. Nevertheless, it seems dishonest and futile to 
suggest that grass roots suggestions from the populace, 
or even the election of a presidential candidate, can 
formulate a true national policy concerning the family. 
A national approach to the family must be broa~er 
than talk of tax breaks and Social Security benefit • 
The family and its relationships must first have a de-
finition, a legal identity. That definition ultimately 
comes from the Supreme Court. From there it filter 
down to our states and finally to the families them elve 
telling them what family life means. Notwith tandin 
the current politics, there is no a surance that the fam-
ily is about to inherit any real legal identity. 
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The Family Altar 
Under the Antenna 
Television as Ritual 
James Combs 
The family circle has widened. 
The worldpool of information 
fathered by electric media . . . 
far surpasses any possible 
influence mom and dad can now 
bring to bear. Character no 
longer is shaped by only 
two earnest, fumbling experts. 
Now all the world's a sage. 
- Marshall McLuhan 
It is still a mystery why people 
watch so much television. Perplex-
ing to the social scientist, infuria-
ting to the cultivator of taste, threat-
ening to the guardians of morality, 
the rapt attention great numbers of 
people pay to popular TV program-
ming remains awesome. Our ability 
to consume TV fare seems inex-
haustible. Some estimates of the 
experts give us the picture: today's 
high school graduates will have 
watched at least 15,000 hours of TV, 
and by age 65 they will have watched 
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Watching television is like a form of worship 
and suggests the analogy to religious ritual. 
3000 days of TV, or about nine years 
of their lives. TV sets are lit in the 
average household over seven hours 
a day, and even when we are not 
actively attending their glow, TV 
is still everywhere-in bars, res-
taurants, hotel lobbies, air terminals, 
stores, even at work. Television, 
even for those who hate it, has be-
come part of our inescapable en-
vironment. TV is now a taken-
for-granted phenomenon whose 
many allures, like the sirens of old, 
cause the holdouts to lash them-
selves to the masts of their books 
to. resist the call that has destroyed 
the minds of so many others. 
As the academic evidence mounts, 
it begins to look as if the small 
minority of TV holdouts may have 
something, although the experts 
are not quite sure what. Our high 
school graduate will have seen many 
thousands of murders on TV, yet 
the vast majority of people still do 
not commit murders; TV is a seden-
tary activity, yet people still work 
and engage in active play; people 
are, as the Nielsen ratings people 
will tell you, very selective about 
what they watch, and thus are not 
totally mesmerized by the siren call. 
Yet we can no longer safely say that 
TV has no consequences. The prob-
lem is in specifying what effects 
this technological leviathan works 
upon us. 
Much of the research attempting 
to calculate the impact of TV on 
people has been what we might term 
one-way psychology: TV communi-
cates something, it makes an im-
pression on people, and it causes 
them to think and act in the world 
in a way that they might not have 
otherwise thought and acted. For 
example, the depiction of a murder 
might "trigger" a response in some 
unhappy soul that "cues" him or 
her to kill. 
The trouble is that not only i 
this "cue" difficult to prove, but 
it bogs down in the chicken and the 
egg dilemma: did the propensity 
toward violence lurk in the indi-
vidual before the TV experience, 
or did the TV experience create 
it? How do we demonstrate that 
TV "impels" the violent act? Did 
the individual "seek" the TV show 
that uggested murder? Where did 
Cain get the notion to slay Abel? 
Too, the focus on the more sensa-
tional and lurid possibilities of TV 
effects may make us lose sight of the 
more ordinary gratifications which 
most people derive from television 
and which shape its programs in the 
first place. For the TV industry is 
always acutely aware of what people 
seem to want to see and tries to pre-
sent those shows which will attract 
a changing audience. In that case, 
it might be instructive to under-
stand TV as popular aesthetics 
rather than as popular psychology. 
For we should never forget that 
TV is play for people- they are 
gratified by it because it transports 
them into fantasy worlds created for 
their amusement. TV is a dramatic 
world which diverts us from mun-
dane reality. (That is not to say that 
our use of TV has no re ation to that 
reality; to the contrary, it can be 
argued that TV drama is a con-
densed and transformed celebration 
of selected aspects of that reality.) 
The argument is simply that TV 
and its audience have adjusted to 
each other over the years, and that 
both the programs presented and 
what is expected by the viewers 
have taken on a ritual pattern. 
Thus the solutions to the aesthetic 
problem of what programs viewers 
will like are constantly changing in 
subtle ways-there are few quantum 
leaps in TV programming- to ad-
just to the changing desires and 
schedules of the audience. Both the 
TV programs and the TV habits 
of audiences take on a ritual form 
which structures expectations into 
predictable transactions between 
medium and viewers. 
Television fill the interlude 
of the day and chedule the re t 
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of it. College students schedule 
classes around their favorite soap 
operas. Restaurants now expect the 
Friday night customers after Dallas 
is over. Supper is held at home till 
after the visit of Dan Rather. 
Each home has its own "TV night," 
and woe be unto the live friend who 
drops by unexpectedly. But if TV is 
a tribal ritual, then we may infer 
that people expect something from 
the experience. Watching TV is 
passive, to be sure, but the ritual 
act of attending to TV must have 
some payoff, some use and gratifi-
cation. 
Which leads us directly into the 
other part of the ritual dialectic: 
the aesthetics of TV creation. The 
daily fare of TV news, sit-corns, game 
shows, soaps, talk shows, docu-
dramas, and so forth all are created 
in the light of the expectations of 
mass audiences. And, again, what do 
people expect from TV? The ritual 
approach to TV suggests that they 
want the ritualized expression of 
their values. TV caters, indeed 
panders, to this expectation by 
constantly pouring old wine into 
new wineskins. It tries to vary its 
presentation of the old in the new by 
placing new characters in new 
settings to perform old rituals. 
The root of the TV aesthetic is 
a ritual of reassurance, but its ever-
present corollary is a ritual of sub-
version. A positive cultural value 
which is celebrated in ritual form 
implies the subversion of its nega-
tive. The simple formula of the 
family sit-com, for instance, asserts 
the values of family life, and thus 
also by implication suggests that 
other forms of life are not as good 
or even bad. The family sit-com 
assures the family audience that 
their mode of living is worthwhile, 
and that threats from the outside 
can be overcome by the family unit. 
The recurrent success of this TV 
formula from / Love Lucy to Eight is 
Enough show both its per istence 
and flexibility , and both the con-
April, 1981 
tinuity and complication of family 
values. The ritual structure of the 
formula is thus inextricably linked 
to the ritual functions the audience 
expects the program to perform. 
But this does not mean, of course, 
that the ritual formula is simple, 
or that each viewer derives the same 
"message" from the show. Audi-
ences may converge on the same 
ritual drama and get out of it very 
different things. Studies of the All 
in the Family sit-com found that 
highly bigoted viewers did not think 
Archie Bunker the butt of the humor 
but rather the show's moral hero! 
And quasi-family dramas of recent 
years, such as M*A*s♦J-r or The 
Mary Tyler Moore Show, present a 
ritual drama from which different 
segments of the audience might 
derive different messages. But 
even with the development of the 
variation of the quasi-family drama 
the basic ritual structure remain : 
the "family" of WKRP in Cincinnati 
or The Love Boat still is internally 
supportive, deals with problem a a 
unit, is based on sentimental af-
fection, and survives through it all. 
(Even though the traditional family 
remains the social unit of many 
ritual dramas, the sub titution of 
such quasi-families through th 
years-Matt Dillon and hi "family" 
on Gunsmoke, the Star Trek "family," 
and even the "family" of old-
blooded pros on Mission Impo -
sible-is interesting in light of th 
changes in the Ameri an famil 
since the 60s.) 
The ritual approach al o p rmit 
the student of televi ion t link 
particular TV formula to our m t~-
ology. If it i the ca e that rtam 
ritual drama re urrentl r nat 
with ma s audience n might 
guess that ome rather imp rtant 
myth i involved. o ritual f rmula 
work by a cident; if r a uran 
and ubver ion f valu ar in-
volved in the formul , th n th 
lighte t T fluff- The B ve_rl J Jrll-
billies, for exam pl - ma be m t u h 
with something more fundamental 
than we may care to admit. Tele-
vision formulas play out the col-
lective fantasies of million of 
ordinary people. There is no point 
in complaining that TV is demean-
ing, corrupting, or ludicrous-all 
of which it may b -when we are 
faced with the po ibility that it i 
the major mediator of our myth-
ology and our technological tory-
teller pinning yarn around th 
tribal campfire. For ood or ill, 
we learn and re-learn our myth-
ology from T _ . Trapp r John and 
Hawkeye, Captain Kirk and Mr. 
Spock, Mary Richard , Lu Ri ar-
do, and other all ar n w part f 
our mythology and f lklor . Th y 
are a "real' a traditi nal 
folk h ro 
our 'new" fairy tal ' . 
If thi m , an 
a k hildr n ab ut th 
the deference we pay when people 
around us are deeply absorbed in a 
program. Like the Sunday School 
Bible story, or even the Mass, tele-
vision communicates to us ritual 
dramas full of adventure and strug-
gle and inevitable justice in which 
evil i defeated. Mythic charac-
ter are represented over and over 
in familiar plots. Not only is good 
reaffirmed and evil subverted, but 
the deed is done in a fantastic set-
ting which heightens the impact 
of the celebration. 
Even the game show, in its own 
insane way, is worshipful. It is a 
ritual drama of acquisition and 
consumption, which teaches in each 
repeated drama that wit, daring, 
and luck may fulfill our dreams of 
private bounty and free booty; 
that greed and competition are 
socially sanctioned; that winners 
get cheers and the big bucks and 
losers disappear with small conso-
lation prizes; that enthusiasm for 
money is shared by the community. 
If the religious analogy has any 
merit, then we may conclude that 
some of the rites of television do 
not necessarily communicate the 
same values as Christianity. 
In any case, the idea of TV as 
worshipful ritual should remind us 
that, like religion, it can be obses-
sive, fanatical, and demonic. Per-
haps, like other religions, TV in 
time will lose some of its early 
charismatic appeal to the masses 
and splinter-via cable and cas-
sette- into many different, smaller 
sects. But until it does, we might 
well remain aware that something 
important is going on in the enor-
mous amount of time millions of 
people devote to watching TV. If 
we can still rise up from our own 
TV sets for a moment and look out 
into the gathering night, we might 
see that in many homes like ours 
the lights are also out-except for an 
eerie glow from a box in one corner 
of each living room. Then we may 
well . wonder, like the anthropolo-
gist in a strange land, whether we 





Down From Theatrical 
Cinema to Telecinema 
Richard Maxwell 
The film projector is a curious 
artifact from the past. As Charles 
Eidsvik points out, it uses "a more 
sophisticated version of the lever 
mechanics that characterizes all 
machines invented eighty years 
ago."1 To evoke the past once more, 
the projector is a kind of magician. 
Like some master illusionist of the 
Victorian age, it blows up tiny still 
images to an awesome scale; it not 
only fills the screen with these 
images but convinces us that they 
move. The con-job is purely me-
chanical (twenty-four frames per 
second) yet when that con-job 
reaches the screen and the eyes we 
accept it as magic. The spell of 
movies resides in this complicity 
among projector, screen, and spec-
tator: a complicity so long established 
1 Cineliteracy: Film Among the Arts (Random 
House, 1978), p. 113 . Film technology 
needs - but has not yet gotten - its historian. 
Richard Maxwell is Assistant Pro-
fessor of English at Valparaiso Uni-
versity, Chairman of the Faculty 
Interdisciplinary Committee on Film 
Studies, and impresario for the foreign 
f£lmscreenings on the Valparaiso campus. 
Purists will be pursued by no 
more than a hint of nostalgia. 
that we hardly think of it as such. 
The preceding account of movies 
is obviously incomplete. Its virtue 
is that it emphasizes the importance 
of a certain technology, created 
under social and historical circum-
stances which no longer wholly 
apply. The movie palaces are gone, 
replaced by suburban cubicles. The 
working-class audience of the city 
has changed its viewing habits 
drastically-or perhaps it has been 
replaced. Now, I shall suggest, the 
technology is changing too. The 
implications are considerable. 
Think back a moment to 1978, 
when Francis Ford Coppola pre-
sented one of the Oscars for The 
Deer Hunter. Coppola took up about 
seven precious seconds of national 
television time to rave over certain 
technological innovations, soon to 
transform the movie industry. It 
was a little hard to tell just what 
these innovations were. Video? 
Electronic editing? A method for 
cloning Marlon Brando? Coppola's 
confused prophecy recurred to me 
perhaps a year and a half later, on 
an evening stroll through a neigh-
borhood park. The barbecues were 
in full blaze. Softball games flour-
ished, as did small shrieking chil-
dren. From a picnic shelter came the 
glow of a television set, across which 
sped images of horse, sand, and sea. 
Those images proved familiar: 
someone had a video cassette hooked 
up to his TV and was showing The 
Black Stallion for the benefit of ran-
dom passersby. Nobody paid it 
much attention. Like everything 
else on TV, The Black Stallion had 
become a background signal - in 
this case a soothing accompaniment 
to the domestic noises of the park. 
We all know by now that video 
cassettes and their pay-TV equiva-
lent, Home Box Office, are rapidly 
becoming a major way for Ameri-
cans to see movies: not just old 
movies but the newest thing too. 
After attending a marketing con-
vention for variou ideo contrap-
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tions, Roger Ebert concluded that 
"The theatrical feature film, the 
most all-encompassing art form of _ 
the twentieth century, has been 
reduced to a necessary marketing 
preliminary for software. "2 Ebert 
points out in the same article that 
there is an unbridgeable gulf be-
tween the quality of a television and 
a big-screen image. This is hardly 
a new perception-the two technol-
ogies are so drastically different-
but apparently it remains a radical 
one. The marketing people couldn't 
care less. What about the rest of us-
and what about Francis Ford 
Coppola? 
movies. I can think of one reason 
anyway. The old distribution sys-
tem has simply broken down. Say 
you read film reviews in The New 
Yorker, Commentary, or any of the 
national magazines that review 
films regularly. Then you try to 
see the movies therein mentioned. 
Any film that doesn't come out of 
Hollywood is condemned to a few 
big-city art houses. Not so sur-
prising, perhaps, but the home-
grown product isn't really much 
better served. Many of the best-
reviewed Hollywood films never 
surface (especially in the midwest!) 
or drop out of sight within a week. 
Popeye (misconceived whole, though 
with weirdly beautiful comic-book 
sets and weirdly beautiful Shelley 
Duvall), Nine to Ft've (a movie that 
promises to be about the working 
world but isn't), and two or three 
horror film . The point i n't that 
the movies are abominabl but that 
theselectionget mallerand mall r. 
It is po ible, of cour e, that 
movies in vid o cas ett form and on 
Home Box Office could hav a od 
effect on thi 
McLuhan was right: The content of a new medium 
becomes the medium it replaces. The theatrical 
feature film has been reduced to a necessary 
preliminary for producing software for television. 
Coppola, who financed The Black 
Stallion, has been a discriminating 
connoisseur and creator of awe-
some, big-screen effects. Surely, 
despite his optimism about new 
technologies, he wouldn't have ac-
cepted the distortions of that video 
cassette. The version of The Black 
Stallion shown in theaters told its 
story through sweeping, vivid 
images: a sinking ship, a deserted 
island, a race track in the rain -
and through all these settings the 
eponymous equine was photo-
graphed in startling fragments so 
that he always seemed about to 
burst the screen. The images can't 
be shrunk or analyzed into TV's 
dots of light-not without disas-
trous loss. 
Given the power of effects like 
the e, which are representative of 
the best in contemporary film, 
there must be pressing reasons why 
the advent of video-cassette and 
Home Box Office has already re-
volutionized the economi of 
2.. . 
ot Bemg There," Atlantic 
D cember. 1980, p. 89 . 
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The Stunt Man "'.5 Indiana opening 
was kept a statewide secret. I don't 
believe John Huston' W~e Blood 
ever arrived. The only way film 
like this can get attention anymor 
is through release on Home Box 
Office. The movie theater , m an-
while, are trading on a few tandard 
items backed by heavy adverti ing 
budgets. At the moment I can 
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There i a grand hi torical irony 
in the current cri i . Traditionall , 
cinema ha been regarded as a 
ma medium who e image were 
capable of unlimited multiplica-
tion and di tribution to the large t 
and lea t differentiated audience 
in hi tory. '3 Described thi way, 
those huge, glamorous image seem 
like a vulgar and frightening in-
tru ion en aesthetic sensibility, the 
ultimate technological tran forma-
tion of art into commodity. In 1930, 
Hart Crane wrote: 
I think of cinemas , 
panoramic sleights/ 
With multitudes bent 
toward ome flashing scene/ 
_ ever disclosed , 
but hastened to again,/ 
Foretold to other eyes 
on the same screen. 
That catches it. The "panoramic 
sleights" of film tantalize but never 
satisfy. The "flashing scene" towards 
which we bend proves to be "never 
disclosed" when our eyes jump 
back to the beginning of the third 
line. Crane's syntax tricks us much 
as the movie does. 
A projector's con-job was 
not so sinister, and our 
rapt attention to the big 
screen was exhilarating 
rather than alienating. 
Alas, in retrospect the trick seems 
worthwhile. The projector's con-
job was not so sinister after all· the 
breathless attention of the audience 
was exhilarating rather than alienat-
ing. Perhaps we will succeed in 
piecing together again the mass 
audience for movies only this time 
we will do it through the agency of 
televi ion. o matter: whatever 
form the new audience takes, it will 
after all be watching TV. Home Box 
Office may offer us sleight , but 
they won't be panoramic. 
•• •• 
3 Bernard Bergonzi. Reading the Thirties 
( niver ityofPitt burgh Pre . 1978). p . 133 . 
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Grave New World 
On Bringing Home 
The Meaning Of 
The Hostages And 
The New Immigrants 
Albert R. Trost 
For most Americans, the return 
of the hostages to the United States 
puts an end to one of the more frus-
trating and baffling incidents in the 
recent history of American foreign 
relations. After an initial celebration 
of the return of the hostages, the 
mood of the country seems to be 
relief that we can now get back to 
thinking about ourselve and our 
economic plight. The inauguration 
of a new President at almost the same 
moment as the release of the hos-
tages helped to re-direct public 
attention and to focus the nation 
on different problems. Even the 
Russian accommodated our col-
lective wish to forget about Iran, 
the Middle Ea t, and the entire 
third-world by continuing to threat-
en Poland and to join in a familiar 
propaganda battle with the Reagan 
administration. The Ru ians are a 
threat we can understa.nd; we have 
Albert R. Tro t is Associate Professor 
of Political Science at Valparaiso Uni-
versit and Acting Chainnan of the 
Department of Political ci.ence at the 
niversit . 
New huddled masses are 
yearning to be free. 
had thirty-five years of practice. 
adly, the important le ons of 
the ho tage-taking may be ignored 
or forgotten. In the everal months 
that have pa sed, there has been 
little leadership from Washington 
to help u draw the le son from the 
incident and adjust our world-
view. The lessons to be emphasized 
are not the old ones about Russian 
(Communist) aggression, Russian-
American confrontation, the bi-
polar tructure of the world, and the 
importance of superior military 
force. The holding of American 
hostages in Iran for over a year is 
not part of this old pattern, nor is it 
simply a lapse in the old pattern or 
a momentary aberration. It is much 
more a portent of things to come, a 
manifestation of a new world in 
which the United States must find 
itself. 
This grave new world is one of too 
many people in places that have not 
enough food or ways of earning 
enough money to buy food. This 
new world is also in very short 
supply of legitimate authority, par-
ticularly at the level of the nation-
state. Most of the some 160 nation-
states in the world do not have 
governments that are seen as legit-
imate by most of their people. 
Where there is little legitimacy, 
force is required to maintain author-
ity. This, in turn, means military 
governments, instability, repression 
of the opposition, and sometimes no 
effective government at all. The 
lack of legitimate authority is often 
in the same nations that have the 
greatest need to raise their tan-
dard of living. 
The rules for interaction among 
nation- tates have changed in thi 
new world. The rule of the old or-
der, the one that carried u through 
the beginning of the 1960s were 
rule et by nation in orth America 
and Europe that did not ha e the 
problem of carcity o er-popula-
tion, and illegitimate government 
that plague mo t of the nation of 
The Cresset 
Half of the immigration in the world is presently to the United States, and this influx 
of new immigrants now accounts for half of the annual population increase in our country. 
the world today. In the old world, 
one could assume that the decision-
makers of the other nations were in 
firm command, but further, were 
usually rational. These were rules 
that even pertained to our confron-
tation with the Soviet Union in the 
"cold war," and probably still do 
govern our mutual relations. In 
this old world of international rela-
tions, diplomacy and international 
law still had some importance. 
Military force could be used as a 
deterrent rather than a provocation. 
The bases for a nation's power and 
prestige were easier to see. 
Are Americans able to see 
beyond the personal threat 
of the new immigrants to 
the larger disruptions in 
the international system? 
The war in Vietnam was more a 
manifestation of the new inter-
national system than the old. Cer-
tainly, our conflict with Iran is 
still more of the new. In the old 
order, the conflict would have been 
more visibly addressed by inter-
national law, diplomacy, and ulti-
mately the application of military 
force. We were frustrated for over a 
year in the use of these instruments 
against Iran. International law was 
rejected by Iran, as it is by many 
states in the third-world, as a ves-
tige of imperialism and foreign 
domination. The rules of diplomacy 
were flaunted in the take-over of 
the embassy itself. Diplomatic activ-
ity was also difficult because of the 
absence of an effective, legitimate 
government in Iran. Finally, even 
the vastly superior military force 
of the United States hardly seemed 
relevant to the situation. Who would 
be the target of such force? Hostage-
taking whether it occurs in the 
world of crime or of international 
relation , is an act of the weak 
again t the strong. Ho tage are 
taken to hold the power of a supe-
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rior police force or stronger nation 
at bay. To use the superior force 
is to risk the lives of the hostages. 
This was certainly not playing by 
"the rules," nor was it a familiar 
situation for the United States. 
Hostage-taking as an interna-
tional political act, of course, did 
not begin in 1979 in Iran, nor has it 
ended there. There were other such 
incidents involving the United 
States even as the hostages were 
being held in Iran (for instance, in 
Columbia). Hostage-taking is some-
times treated as part of a whole 
complex of violent international 
interactions now called interna-
tional terrorism. Terrorism is not 
a sufficiently neutral concept (one 
man's terrorist may be another 
man's freedom fighter), but there i 
no denying that the international 
system is experiencing an increase 
of incidents that are violent, that 
show little respect for national 
boundaries, and that are meant to 
bring psychological rather than 
physical pressure to bear. In the e 
interactions there is a pattern of 
the weak-against-the-strong and a 
rising disrespect for the old rule 
of international law, diplomacy, 
and limited war. 
II 
Asia. Second, was the entry of large 
numbers of refugees from Cuba and 
Haiti in the last year. Third, the 
longest and most exten ive immigra-
tion of all is the movement of Mexi-
cans into the United tate . 
Behind the high drama of the 
re cue of tarving refugee on the 
high seas (and behind the dome tic 
drama of the exploitation of ille-
gal alien in the nit d tate ), lie 
the reality of car ity ov r-popu-
lation , and ille itimat p liti al 
authority in other part of th world. 
Even though 'th oth r part of th 
world" involv d in thi 
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food is, like the new immigrant, at our doorstep. 
ture more attention. More people 
are now entering the United States 
annually, over one million, than 
entered in the big immigration 
decade, 1901-1910. This influx now 
accounts for half the annual popula-
tion increa e of the country. Over 
half of the immigrants are Spanish-
speaking, most coming from Mexico, 
and almost half are here illegally. 
As the hostage crisis affected the 
United States most directly, so im-
migration falls more heavily on the 
United States than most other na-
tions. In fact, if immigration carries 
the implication of permanent settle-
ment, half of the immigration in the 
world is presently to the United 
States. Other nations, with the pos-
sible exception of China, are often 
only transit stops on a migration 
that eventually leads to the United 
States. 
Both the pattern of immigration 
and the quantity are new. Restric-
tive immigration policies in the 
United States until 1965 limited the 
total number and the nationality 
of the immigrants. Most came from 
Europe, and many were refugees 
from repellent ideological or reli-
gious systems. The United States 
was a political haven sought for 
sophisticated political motives. 
Since 1965, under new immigration 
policies, all nations are treated 
equally. Since the mid-1970s our 
immigration policy has also allowed 
many to enter under special excep-
tions provoked by world political 
and economic upheavals. Immi-
grants from Southeast Asia are one 
example, and today's immigrant is 
commonly fleeing the turmoil and 
deprivation of the new world 
around us. 
When many Americans hear of 
Mexican immigrants, they are likely 
to see such images as a cheap labor 
supply, competition for native jobs, 
a strain on our social welfare sys-
tein, a threat to the political power 
of other minorities in the country, 
the higher costs of bi-lingual serv-
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ices, or another example of lax 
border control. Some may even see 
a need for charity and the acceptance 
of strangers. There are special-
interest spokesmen aplenty to re-
inforce each and every one of these 
images. 
However, beyond these images, 
ea~h Mexican immigrant is a former 
resident of a third-world country 
that has 68 million people, of whom 
many are poorly fed and without 
regular jobs. There will probably 
be 60 million more Mexicans in the 
next twenty years, requiring the 
creation of 700,000 new jobs every 
year. Mexico fortunately has a 
fairly stable and legitimate govern-
ment to try to deal with its prob-
lems of overpopulation and scarcity, 
but the pressure upon Mexicans to 
move north in search of a more 
secure life will remain very strong 
for the foreseeable future. (Mean-
while, most of the third-world has 
the same, or worse, economic prob-
lems as Mexico, and these problems 
in many countries are often com-
pounded by the further problem of 
illegitimate political authority.) 
Americans live in a grave new 
world, and they are more likely to 
be in more sustained and more 
direct confrontation with it than in 
any time in their national history. 
That new world, like the immi-
grant, is now at our doorstep. 
The hostage-taking in Iran, the 
increased immigration to the United 
States, and the power of the OPEC 
oil cartel are among the many signs 
that the world has changed. There 
are new actors in new kinds of inter-
actions, and the rules of the inter-
national system and its structures 
of power have radically changed. 
The only question is whether, after 
almost twenty years of such funda-
mental change in our world, we have 
noticed it. In the spring of 1981, 
there has been little official ac-
knowledgment in Washington of 
any change in our world. 
•• •• 
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The reissue of R. K. Narayan's 
The Swami and Friends, The Bachelor 
of Arts, and The English Teacher by 
the The University of Chicago Press 
suggests that Indo-Anglian litera-
ture ( a term coined by scholars to 
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distinguish Indian writing in En-
glish) has finally come of age. Such 
academic recognition may perhaps 
still the controversy that has raged 
for nearly fifty years over the merits 
of literature written by those for 
whom English remains, however 
fluent and versatile their use, a 
second language. It may also win a 
renewed exposure for works that 
have largely gone unnoticed in the 
United States. 
Although Indians have used En-
glish for creative writing for over a 
century, they are often treated as 
second class citizens both at home 
and abroad. In India, the critical 
opinion, perhaps tainted by nation-
alistic fervor, assumes that all works 
of distinction must be undertaken 
in the mother tongue, and that any-
thing written in an acquired lan-
guage must inevitably be false, 
artificial, and out of touch with the 
realities of the author's existence. 
The reviews in the West, even when 
lavish in praise, reduce Indo-
Anglian literature to exotica in 
their raptures over the lilt of Indian 
English and its richness of color and 
texture. Such praise or blame is un-
necessary and beside the point. If 
a writer chooses English for creative 
expression, his choice must be 
respected and the results judged 
objectively and honestly. 
This is not to deny, of course, 
that every lndo-Anglian writer faces 
a unique challenge in molding the 
English language to his needs. He 
must write with passionate preci-
sion, but also in a way that is dis-
tinctively Indian. He is, after all, 
writing in English about people 
who do not normally speak or think 
in English. Even those writers who 
choose to write in English despair 
about the results. S. Y. Krishna-
wamy concludes that most English 
novels of Indian life are poor stuff. 
"To the Indian there is something 
unmistakably ridiculous in two 
Indians conversing with each other 
in ornate and out of date English 
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. . . or in phrases that read well 
in the original [language] but are 
automatically burlesqued in the 
translations."1 Such results are not 
inevitable, and the best Indo-Anglian 
writers have adapted English rather 
successfully to their needs. Their 
strategies are diverse. 
On one extreme are writers like 
Markandaya whose style has the uni-
form ease of public school English 
and who seems to take special care 
to avoid any Indianisms in his lan-
guage. The prose is correct and 
competent, but lacks any sense of a 
distinctive! y Indian sensibility. I 
see this as a failure. As Raja Rao 
said in his preface to Kanthapura, 
"We cannot write like the English. 
We should not. "2 At the other 
extreme are writers like Anand who 
attempt literal translations of Indian 
expressions: "Are you talking true 
talk?" "How is your gentle tempera..: 
ment?" Once the comic possibilities 
of such gimmicks are exhausted, the 
reader comes to resent the language 
as both tiresome and distracting. 
Also, such obvious lndianisms are 
pointless when we remember that 
the writer is generally working with 
characters who do not speak Engli h 
and writing about situation wher 
English is not used . 
Within this context, Narayan' 
achievement as an Indian writing 
in English becomes di tinctiv . 
Narayan's language is imple, hi 
diction unobtrusive. Hi pro 
retains a subtle Indian flavor with-
out ever being elf- on iou 1 
Indian: 
This pleased Mani greatly For the fir t 
time that evening he laughed . and laugh d 
heartily too. He hook waminathan and 
gave such an affectionate twi t to h1 
that waminathan gave a long howl nd 
then he suddenly asked . "Did ou brin 
the thin that I wanted?" 
"Oh. Mani! I beg a hundr d pard?n of 
you . My mother was all th tim in th 
1 . Y. Kri hnaswamy. Ka/yam' llu band 
( adras · by th author. n d ). pr fac 
2 Raja Rao. Kanthapura (Bomba ford 
niv . Pres . 19 7). for word . 
kitchen. I could not get it." ["It" referred 
to lime pickles .] 
"You are a nasty little coward-Oh, 
this river bank and the fine evening. How 
splendid it would have been!" 
ara an' 
pared to a 'on 
b n 
rang ma 
perf ctly uit 
vi ion that 
wami, p. 14 
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Narayan's wholly Indian vision of his characters contrasts with the vision of Indian 
writers obsessed with misfit characters created by the conflict of the East and West. 
event from the u ual we tern en e 
of a significant moment which alters 
the cour e of action or clarifies 
hitherto inexplicit forces or re-
lationships. 
When Swami confronts the head-
master to turn up for the all impor-
tant cricket match, or when Chandran 
runs away to Madras, the events do 
not create or suggest new possibili-
ties in character or direction. Even 
the highly charged scene in The 
English Teacher where Susila con-
tracts typhoid lacks any obvious 
sense of climax. Susila's falling into 
Krishnan's arms and her repeated 
washings at the tap are, in Krish-
nan's words, "a sad anti-climax to 
a very pleasing morning" (p. 62). 
Narayan's plots are almost anti-
plots. The story does not move 
forward with dynamic logic to an 
inevitable conclusion. Whatever has 
threatened the stability- the mis-
understanding between Swami and 
Rajam, Chandran's doomed love 
affair, or the death of Krishnan's 
wife-is overcome, and the cosmos 
returns to its original order. 
Narayan's plots accurately mirror 
the static and traditional ethos of 
a small Indian town. Narayan's 
Malgudi, the small town which is 
the consistent backdrop of his 
novels, is as mythical as Faulkner's 
Yoknapatawpha or Hardy's Wessex. 
Yet so persuasive is Narayan's crea-
tion that scholars often get trapped 
in the literary game of identifying 
the original. Surely it is less im-
portant to pin Malgudi on the map 
than to understand what it repre-
sents? With its Sarayu river, Select 
Picture House, Regal Haircutting 
Salon, ew Extensions (a replica 
of countless Model Towns that 
scatter over the countryside and em-
body middle class aspiration with 
their western tyle bungalows and 
gardens), the statue of an erstwhile 
British administrator, the open 
gutters, and the crowded market 
place, arayan deftly captures the 
ambience of the mall town where 
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so many of us in India grew up. 
I too remember forming a cricket 
club like Swami and his friends. 
With our broken bats and stump 
made of sticks and our overs bowled 
with rubber balls on street corners 
and empty lots, we also tried to as-
sociate ourselves with the magic of 
English and Australian cricket 
stars. Like Swami, I too went to my 
mission school; and if, unlike Chan-
dran, I didn't make it to the mission 
college, my Hindu College never-
theless faced the mission college, 
shared its curricula of Keats and 
Shakespeare, and forced me to cram 
for those life and death final exams. 
Malgudi's world is my world, its 
pitfalls and joys mine as well, and 
its enduring charm is hard to resist. 
Narayan is still in touch with his 
society; his vision is wholly Indian. 
In this, he contrasts with many Indo-
Anglian writers who seem obsessed 
with the East-West theme of cultural 
conflict and continually focus on 
heroes who are misfits because they 
are influenced by the West. Nara-
yan's India, however, is hardly 
touched by the British Raj- a true 
reflection of colonial India where 
westernization was superficial and 
largely confined to the metropoli-
tan areas. Mr. Brown, the principal, 
is the only Englishman we see in 
these novels, and he is peripheral 
to the plots. Seldom seen or heard, 
he and his kind have little cultural 
impact on Malgudi. 
These novels focus, instead, on 
the domestic life of the average man. 
We live with the ordinary routines 
of Swami, Chandran, and Krishnan 
as they go forward with their every-
day concerns. Swami's friend hips 
and rivalries, Chandran's efforts 
to arrange meetings of the History 
Society, and Krishnan's quarrels 
and reconciliations with Susila over 
mundane matters like grocery hop-
ping absorb u without any en e of 
monotony. arayan' ability to 
create and affirm a en e of the con-
tinuity and community of life in a 
small Indian town is his greatest 
strength. It is also intimately re-
lated to the quality of reticence 
which marks Narayan's best prose. 
Even moments of deep emotion are 
understated. Returning home from 
a house-hunting expedition, Krish-
nan communicates his happiness 
and fulfillment in marriage in a few 
poignant but superbly measured 
words: 
We ceased to pass any remarks or comment 
and settled in a tranquil silence. I studied 
her face without her knowledge. A great 
peace had descended on her. " It is God's 
infinite grace that has given me this girl. " 
The Jutka was filled with the scent of the 
jasmine in her hair and the glare of the 
indigo-coloured saree. 
The English Teacher, p . 64 
This muted emotion, particularly 
between man and woman, is partly 
a result of Narayan's essentially 
comic vision and partly an expres-
sion of his peculiarly Indian sensi-
bility. As Narayan perceptively 
remarked in an article, "W estem 
society is based on a totally different 
conception of the man-woman re-
lationship from ours."4 Married 
love and not romantic love is the 
more frequent and appropriate 
subject of Indian fiction. Nor are the 
eternal triangles that so wonderfully 
complicate western fiction of much 
use to the Indian writer because 
Indian social conditions are not 
quite conducive to such excursions. 
Even when the triangle appears in 
Indian fiction, the third side of the 
triangle is not a man . or a woman 
but the force of the extended family. 
The self-fulfillment of the indi-
vidual, especially when it under-
mines commitment to the larger 
family, is alien to Indian tradition. 
Within this context, romantic love 
is most often an aberration of the 
immature. While it may be ympa-
thetically treated, it cannot escape 
an ironic crutiny. 
arayan offer us a very Indian 
ver ion of romantic love in The 
4 R. K. arayan. "En Ii h in India." The 
Times of India, 2 December. 1964. p . 5. 
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Bachelor of Arts. Chandran imagi'nes 
he has fallen in love with a girl, 
merely by seeing her from a dis-
tance on the beach: 
He was going to stare at her and take in a 
Jot of details regarding her features. He 
had not made out whether she was fair or 
light brown ; whether she had long hair or 
short, and whether her eyes were round or 
almond-shaped; and he also had some 
doubts about her nose. 
The Bachelor of Arts, p. 108 
Although this "optical communion" 
becomes a daily habit, he never 
manages to speak to her, even after 
he has persuaded his distraught 
parents to start the negotiations. 
When the alliance cannot be made, 
for very Indian reasons like mis-
matched horoscopes, Chandran's 
anguish, though real, is never per-
ceived as tragic or even very serious. 
The novel ends with Chandran 
happily in love with the girl his 
parents finally secure for him. 
In Indian society, the bond be-
tween man and woman is not de-
valued, but it is firmly placed 
within a host of other relationships. 
Narayan is particularly successful 
in sketching these other relation-
ships. Without a false touch, and 
with very few words, Narayan inti-
mates the affection between family 
members. His Malgudi novels are 
not novels of personal relations in a 
western sense because in Malgudi 
communication is never a problem. 
Here the social fabric is still intact 
and nurtures the individuals within 
it. Not being a sentimentalist, Nara-
yan recognizes the disjunctions in 
relationships, but he also recognizes 
the ultimate continuity of a society 
firmly grounded in tradition. Like 
it gutters, the social ties of Malgudi 
may sometimes be polluted, but 
their force and flow cannot be 
checked for long. 
aturally, any e cape from 
Malgudi's fold, whatever the moti-
vation, are foredoomed. wami run 
away from school and Chandran 
trie to escape from the memorie 
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of his unsuccessful love affair, but 
both find the world outside Malgudi 
inhospitable. Swami is trapped, 
literally, in dark woods that lead 
nowhere, and Chandran spiritually 
suffocates from the impersonality 
of Madras. Madras, that epitome of 
metropolitan confusion, represents 
all that Malgudi is not. Chandran 
finds himself wishing that the 
people of Madras were more human: 
They were so mechanical and impersonal ; 
the porter at the station had behaved as if 
he were blind , deaf, and mute; and now 
this hotel man would not even look at his 
guest; these . fellows simply did not care 
what happened to you after they had re-
ceived your money. 
The Bachelor of Arts. p. 157 
The escapes prove illusory pre-
cisely because the community of 
Malgudi is so strong and tenaciou . 
In the Indian view, change is unreal: 
this is a fundamental ontological 
fact. Those who cannot adapt to thi 
unchanging order are unsung mi -
fits. Narayan does not debate uch 
issues, nor does he take obviou 
sides on moral question ; but in hi 
world it is the average person wh 
survives. "The average i the po i-
tive." Perhaps, even for an Indian, 
this is too limited a view of life. Y t 
Narayan is to be faulted le f r 
lacking passionate concern with 
social and spiritual ideas and mor 
for occasionally stepping out id 
his own self-impo ed limit . 
Given his comic mod , arayan 
is be t when he is gently ironi and 
mildly satirical. Becau he affirms 
traditional Indian valu h ap-
propriately avoid tra d . H 
fails most obviou ly " h n 
tations no longer work to hi 
vantage-for exampl , in th · 
half of The English Teacher. 
the heroine die , th n I i · 
charming and mo ing. 
arayan et pr 1pi d in at-
tempting to pro id th ast rn 
an wer to d ath. We lik Krishnan. 
are to realiz that d th il -
lu ion. In th no I th n 
the world of flesh and spirit can be 
bridged, especially when providen-
tially aided by a band of spirits and 
the requisite medium. Since Narayan 
is in earne t and refu e to treat 
these mystical experience ironical-
ly, he embarra e . 
Predictably, the e very p rtion 
of the novel won rave revi w in th 
West. We learn from 
My Dateless Diary that a w 
American ditor prai d The English 
Teacher a arayan' b t n 1 and 
a young m ri an lady ( fr m ali-
fornia, no d ubt) b g d 
to h lp her achi 
tual exp ri n 
reported ara 
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The Christian 
As Public Servant 
John Strietelmeier 
For thirty-four years, to my 
certain knowledge, some of us at 
Valparaiso University have been 
preoccupied with the idea of what 
a Christian should look like as a 
public servant. We have asked many 
questions. Would he or she be 
generally liberal or generally con-
servative in outlook? Would he or 
she be guided by a morality notice-
ably different from that of his or 
her colleagues in government? Is 
there a specifically Christian style 
in public life? Does the Faith itself 
offer insights to Christian public 
servants which are not available 
to non-Christians? 
When we first started asking 
these questions, a young Lutheran 
medical doctor was beginning to 
dabble in politics in a small town 
just fifty miles from our campus. 
He started out as county coroner, 
then moved up to the state House 
of Representatives, of which he sub-
sequently served for several terms 
as Speaker. In 1973, he became 
Governor. Last January this once-
young phy ician, Otis R. Bowen, 
M.D., left office after what may well 
be the most distinguished governor-
ship in the history of the State 
of Indiana. 
Distinguished in many ways. Doc 
Bowen dominated Indiana politics 
more completely, and for a much 
32 
longer time, than any of his pred-
ecessors. He was unbeatable not 
only in his own races for public 
office but also in those off-years 
when candidates for other offices 
made sure that voters were aware 
that they were "Doc's Boys." In 
the state legislature the Governor 
got pretty much what he wanted 
because it was pretty well under-
stood that the voice of the Governor 
was the voice of the people. And in 
the executive branch it was generally 
understood that you had . to be as 
clean as the proverbial hound's 
tooth or you would have the Gover-
nor himself to answer to. 
Why do I, a lapsed Republican 
turned liberal Democrat, consider 
Governor Bowen not only a great 
public servant but a kind of para-
digm of the Christian in public 
office? 
I suppose that it is because he has 
come as close as anyone I know to 
answering in his public career the 
questions we have been asking for 
so many years here on campus about 
the Christian in public life. Not 
that he would feel comfortable being 
labeled a paradigm. But he has 
helped me, at least, to understand 
that paradigms that have any under-
standable meaning for real-life 
human beings are created not in 
intellectual exercises but in the 
cauldron of day-to-day involvement 
in real-life situations. 
I certainly have no intention 
of disparaging the intellect. But the 
intellect is only one of many tools 
that we have been given to appre-
hend reality and to project beyond 
reality some kind of ideal or model 
or paradigm. It is one of the weak-
nesses of the intellect that it can and 
often does project beyond reality an 
ideal or model which, while imagin-
able, is not really po sible in the 
real world of fallen human beings. 
A life well lived, by contrast, 
sets before us a high, but attainable 
model. It does not set before us the 
impossible challenge to be what 
man does not have it in him to be, 
but the manageable challenge to be 
all that we can be - marred as that 
will necessarily be by the defects 
of our humanness. 
So, in these terms, what did 
Governor Bowen tell us about the 
Christian in public life? 
He did not flaunt his piety, real 
though it was. He was not much 
given to what Vic Hoffmann used to 
call "Jesus talk." He did not claim 
for his generally conservative views 
any Divine endorsement. There was, 
in other words, nothing on the sur-
face to distinguish him from any 
Jew or Buddhist of noble disposi-
tion and absolute integrity. 
And yet the light shone through-
in his bearing, in his speech, in his 
conduct of the government. I have 
seen that light in other great Chris-
tian public servants-in Mark 
Hatfield and Albert Quie and Paul 
Simon, to name only three. And it 
is as unmistakable as the voice 
of God. 
What is it? I don't know that I 
can capture it in words, but I ap-
prehend it as a strange mixture of 
humility and self-confidence. The 
humility of St. Francis: "What a 
man is in the sight of God, that he is 
and no more." The self-confidence 
of O. P. Kretzmann: "What a man is 
in the sight of God, that he is and 
no less." The best word that I can 
find for it is integrity-a wholeness 
resulting, if one is a Christian, in 
an entire focus on one's responsi-
bility to carry out that ministry of 
reconciliation, of healing, which 
follows from the redemptive work 
of Christ. 
To err on the side of self-confi-
dence is to fall into the obnoxious 
priggishne s of the Moral Majority. 
To err on the side of a false humil-
ity is to reduce one's elf to the 
status of just another real nice guy. 
Somewhere, in the trait and narrow 
space between the e two model , 
lies the paradigm we have been 
looking for. ~= 
The Cresset 
